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Abstract
Development aid comes in many different forms, and has a large range
of effects on the recipient countries and their economies. There exists a
vast literature - in economics and other fields of research - on consequences
of foreign aid on the recipient economies. Scientific evidence suggests at
least that few general conclusions can be made concerning these effects and
consequences. It is clear, however, that there are consequences of aid that
are not intended - and maybe not even foreseen - by the donors, and that
some of these might be hindering economic growth and development. The
first part of this thesis is a review of some of the contributions from economic
literature on the effects and consequences of development aid on developing
economies.
Some developing country governments might consider the negative effects
of dependency on development aid as large. And even if they don’t, a goal
of growth, development and poverty reduction might lead to expectations
of lower amounts of development aid flowing into the country in the future.
Such expectations could lead the government to search for other sources of
capital. An alternative way to finance public spending and investment for
some countries receiving development aid, could be to enter international
capital markets, and borrow money from commercial lenders.
The hypothesis laying grounds for this thesis is that inflows of develop-
ment aid may hinder some developing countries from accessing commercial
international capital markets. I analyze this hypothesis in a theoretical
framework, building a stylized model of the interaction between a develop-
ing country, a commercial lender, and a donor of development aid. The main
implication of the model is that - at least under some circumstances - the
presence of an aid-donor can hinder the developing country from accessing
the market, through increasing the riskiness of giving loans, perceived by
the commercial lender.
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1 Introduction
Among the challenges faced by the world today, many would argue that poverty -
and distribution of assets and resources laying grounds for welfare - are the most
important. Large parts of the world have seen unprecedented economic growth,
and rapid improvements in living standards, during the previous century. Many
countries that have lagged behind in this development, have been seen to catch
up with the countries ahead, over the last decades. However, there are still many
countries - a large part of them in Sub-Saharan Africa - that have not been a
part of this. Large populations still live in deep poverty, and the road ahead is
uncertain. Hopefully, this century will show that also these countries can to some
extent escape poverty, and that it is possible to distribute our resources in a way
that is more ”fair” than what we see in the world today.
Development aid has been an attempt by the industrialized world to contribute
to development and economic growth in other parts of the world. There exists a
vast literature on different kinds of challenges for the recipient country, that might
arise when they receive large amounts of foreign aid. The scope of this thesis is
not to attempt to explain all the effects of inflows of aid in a developing economy,
but to look at one potential problem that a government receiving such foreign
aid might face. My hypothesis is that if a developing country government wants
to enter international capital markets by issuing government bonds, they can be
hindered by the mere fact that they receive foreign aid. I will put forward the
argument that a potential commercial lender - the potential buyer of the bonds -
might perceive the riskiness involved in buying the bonds as higher when the issuer
receives development aid. In section 4, I build a theoretical model of the interaction
between a developing country and a commercial lender, with and without the
presence of a donor of development aid.
The first part of this thesis is a discussion and a review of the most relevant
literature, on how development aid potentially affects the recipient economies. In
section 2.1, I specifically focus on development aid in Africa, since many countries
receiving large amounts of aid - and that have seen low levels of growth - are on
this continent. I then look at a few specific issues concerning development aid, that
are prevalent in economic literature, in section 2.2. The emphasis of this section
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is on unforeseen - and possibly adverse - effects of foreign aid, which are not in-
tended by the donors. The section investigates several possible explanations for the
”lack of development” that has been seen in some countries receiving development
aid over long periods of time. Section 2.3 provides a brief discussion of different
ways in which the macroeconomy of the recipient country might be affected by
inflows of development aid. Finally, section 2.4 provides a short summary of how
development aid relates to economic growth and development.
In section 3, I look at commercial international capital markets, as a potential
alternative for developing country governments to finance public spending and
investment. Firstly,section 3.1 reviews some contributions from the literature on
how flows of money in general may affect the recipient countries. Furthermore,
section 3.2 and 3.3 discuss some features of these markets, and how development
aid might potentially affect the possibility to enter the markets.
Finally, in section 4, I introduce the theoretical model, and discuss its implica-
tions. The model set up is presented in section 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. Subsequently,
the main implication of the model, is discussed in section 4.5. In section 4.6, I
relate the previous discussion to potential welfare effects of the existence of an aid
donor in this set up. Lastly, section 4.7 introduces some relevant extensions to the
model.
The main subject of this thesis is the potential effect of development aid on the
access of developing countries to international capital markets. The opportunity
to issue bonds, and in this way borrow money, in a commercial market, may by
some countries be perceived as a better option than continued dependency on
development aid. However, I will argue that foreign aid may in itself hinder access
to the market, and some countries might thus be left ”trapped”. This is potentially
one channel through which development aid might have adverse effects on growth
and development in the recipient country.
When I discuss development aid, I do not very precisely state how I define
this expression. Foreign aid is transferred in different ways, with different types
of donors and with or without several types of conditionality connected to it. To
clearly distinguish the effects and consequences of different kinds of development
aid is out of scope for this thesis. A slight explanation is, however, needed here.
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In my theoretical framework the term ”development aid” should be viewed as
some type of relatively unconditional transfers to the national government of the
recipient country. Different kinds of projects directed towards specific groups,
areas etc., or emergency aid, is thus not what I here have in mind. To keep the
generality of the analysis, I do not specify this any further.
Development is another term frequently used in this thesis, with different mean-
ings. The vast subject of how to define ”development” or ”economic development”,
will be left out of this thesis. However, I will use these expressions in the following
sections, and some clarity is needed. When nothing else is specified, I will mainly
refer to economic growth when using the term development. It is however clear,
that in parts of my discussion, the effects mentioned may apply wider than only
to pure growth in GDP. Thus I will keep the somewhat fussy term ”development”,
to not reject this possibility.
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2 Development Aid and Economic Growth
In ”Was development assistance a mistake?”, Easterly (2007) argues that the large
amounts of development aid flowing from industrialized to developing countries
over many decades, have not contributed to development, mainly because the
prevalent assumptions regarding how to create development have not been the
right ones.
After World War II, development aid has been given by loans and by grants,
from different types of donors, to different countries, in different ways, and with
different levels of conditionality. Inspired by the effectiveness of the Marshall Plan
(The European Recovery Program); the actual ability of the United States to
contribute to the rebuilding of Europe through large transfers, the industrialized
countries of the West has attempted to support growth in the developing world by
similar means. Besides, the threat from communism induced large and powerful
economies to enter developing countries - with aid as one of their aims. In the rest
of this thesis, I will focus on the large amounts of development aid that has been
donated after the Marshall Plan.
Some countries which historically have received quite large amounts of devel-
opment aid have also managed to generate economic development, among these
some of the East Asian ”Tigers”. But more commonly - and perhaps surprisingly
- growth rates in countries supposedly ”helped” by foreign aid have been very
low, some even negative. Among the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, this ten-
dency is striking. According to statistics from the OECD Development Assistance
Committee (DAC); Benin, Burkina Faso, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi,
Gambia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Mozambique, Togo and Zambia are all among the
group of countries receiving more than 10 % of their gross national income (GNI)
in development assistance in 2009. As examples of extreme cases are Burundi (41.2
%), Democratic Republic of Congo (23.5 %), Liberia (78.3 %) and Sierra Leone
(23 %, all numbers from 2009). In 2009, the total transfers from DAC-countries
were according to the same source USD 120 000 million, 4 086 million of these
came from Norway (OECD, 2010b,c).
According to Easterly (Easterly, 2007, p.329);
Over the past 42 years, $568 billion (in todays dollars) has flowed into
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Africa, yet per capita growth of the median African nation has been
close to zero.
Whether development aid is good or bad for development can of course not
be understood by only comparing levels of aid with growth rates in developing
countries. Economic growth in itself does not give a complete picture of a coun-
try’s development, and even if economic growth is the focus of attention, a whole
range of other factors than development aid obviously play important parts. In
addition, the countries receiving development aid are not randomly chosen, which
would make simple regressions give misleading answers to the question of whether
economic development historically has been enforced or hindered by foreign aid.
Nonetheless, there have been numerous attempts by economists to investigate this
relationship, both theoretically and empirically. I will mention some of the contri-
butions to this literature in the following. Though one cannot necessarily conclude
that industrialized countries make matters worse in developing countries in their
attempt to support development, many of the scientific studies in this area show
that one should also be careful in drawing the opposite conclusion - that develop-
ment aid will in general spur development.
Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008) provide a meta study on estimates of the
effect of development aid on economic growth. On the basis of 543 estimates from
68 research papers, they find a small positive average effect. They emphasize,
however, that the effect is statistically insignificant, and that the differences in
results between studies are large. Their study can thus hardly be taken in favor
of a positive view regarding whether development aid works or not. But even if
the average effect of aid on growth rates is close to zero, there are, as mentioned,
examples of countries that have seemingly made good use of foreign capital in the
form of development aid, in supporting development. Burnside and Dollar pub-
lished the highly influential ”Aid, policies and growth” in 2000. They performed an
empirical investigation of the relationship between foreign aid, economic policies
and economic growth, and concluded that (Burnside and Dollar, 2000, p. 847);
[]aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good
fiscal, monetary, and trade policies but has little effect in the presence
of poor policies.
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Their findings resulted in a much larger attentiveness to how aid is allocated,
and many donors and proponents of aid advocated the view that as long as do-
mestic policies are ”good”, aid should be expected to give positive results.
Despite the somewhat optimistic view of Burnside and Dollar, later work has
revealed several weaknesses of their findings. Easterly (2003) investigates the ro-
bustness and broader applicability of their results. He concludes that changes in
the specifications of ”good” and ”bad” policies, ”aid” and ”growth”, shows that
the links found by Burnside and Dollar are not very robust, and the relationship
between the effect of aid and economic policies in the receiving country is not as
straight forward as many promoters of aid - supported by Burnside and Dollar
- had been suggesting. Easterly’s findings are based on both a review of other
recent empirical work on this field, and on theoretical foundations for the con-
nections between development aid and growth. Among the contributions referred
to by Easterly is Boone (1996), who tests predictions regarding development aid
effectiveness. Boone connects the effects of aid to the political regimes in the de-
veloping countries. Building a theoretical model, he suggests that lack of capital is
not a crucial factor in countries with low growth, whereas distortionary economic
policies put in place by policy makers, are. In this framework, development aid
does not cause economic growth, because it does not change the incentives of policy
makers, and as a consequence does not increase investment (rather consumption
and the size of the government). These predictions are supported by empirical
results, provided by Boone, showing no significant increase in investment when
aid levels are high, and correspondingly no improvements in human development
indicators, as a measure of benefits for the poor.
Hansen and Tarp (2001) to some extent confirm the lack of empirical evidence
of positive effects of aid on growth. In addition to reviewing earlier empirical
results, they use cross-country data, from countries both in Sub-Saharan Africa
and on other continents, to look at the relationship between aid and growth in
real GDP per capita. Their findings do show positive effects of growth, but are
not robust, and are highly sensitive to both the choice of estimator and the set
of control variables used in the regression. When controlling for investment and
human capital, there seems to be no positive effect of aid. However, there might
of course still be a positive relationship between aid and these two factors.
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Roodman (2007) uses a similar approach, reviewing seven important papers in-
vestigating the aid-growth relationship, and testing robustness by slightly changing
the specification choices. Roodman argues that since aid-growth regressions can be
specified in so many different ways - and the choice of specification must to some
extent be arbitrary - one could potentially get large discrepancies in results as a
consequence only of specification. The conclusion he provides is that all results
investigated appear fragile, and Roodman states that (Roodman, 2007, p. 275);
Despite decades of trying, cross-country growth empirics have yet to
teach us much about whether and when aid works.
Since other factors such as institutions, policy, domestic savings and invest-
ment, inequality etc. are of course decisive for development and economic growth,
and also in various ways connected to development aid flows, it seems difficult to
pin down explicit results regarding the ceteris paribus relationship between aid
and growth, on the basis of empirical testing.
2.1 Development Aid in Africa
In Sub-Saharan Africa, growth rates have been especially depressing over the last
decades. While there has been seen rapid economic growth in several Asian coun-
tries since the 1960’s, the challenges posed by poverty and lack of development are
still overwhelming in Sub-Saharan Africa. According to OECD statistics, some
of the ”worst cases”, over the last decade has been Coˆte d’Ivoire (with average
annual real GDP growth over the period 2001-2009 of 0.9 %), Eritrea (0.8 %),
Guinea Bissau (1.1 %), Liberia (1.3 %) and Togo (1.8 %), not to mention the
extreme case of Zimbabwe, who has had an average annual growth rate of real
GDP of - 5.4 % over the period 2001 to 2009 (OECD, 2010a).
At the same time, several of these African countries have been the recipients
of ample levels of development aid. There is a vast scientific literature, also in
economics, attempting to explain the low growth levels in Sub-Saharan Africa,
and the failure of development aid to change the trend. Both theoretically and
empirically, economists have explored different ways in which development aid
is connected to economic growth and development. Questions asked are such
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as whether aid lowers or increases saving and investment, whether it creates or
hinders financial development, whether it affects government’s size or policies, or
changes other important institutions etc. In summary; how does development aid
affect options, opportunities and incentives of policy makers and other agents in
the economy, in ways that affect economic growth and development?
To understand the foundations and motivation for development aid in the past,
would be a starting point in trying to answer these questions. Dollar and Easterly
(1999) look to the ideas that have laid ground for development aid in Africa over
time. They argue that there has historically been two main ”keys” to how aid
could provide growth. The first is through increased investment. If aid can finance
investment, and increased investment is crucial to economic growth, it would be
plausible that aid could result in higher growth rates. However, when testing the
relationship between aid and investment empirically, they do not find support for
the hypothesis that development aid does in fact increase investment. The second
”key” is aid-induced policy reform. Reforms of policy can be costly, and aid could
potentially give developing country governments the opportunity to reform in a
way that would enforce growth. Neither in this area do they find support for such
positive effects of aid in empirical data. Dollar and Easterly conclude that a large
part of the differences in economic performance and growth can be explained by
differences in economic policies. However, reforms do not seem to be dependent
on, or strongly influenced by, development aid.
As a preliminary conclusion, the scientific evidence regarding how development
aid have influenced economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, must be said to be
inconclusive.
Not only is it more than unclear in which ways aid affects incentives and pos-
sibilities of the government and the private sector, and which factor determines
these effects, but it is a topic in itself to attempt to understand which other factors
are important in creating economic growth. And not least to develop an under-
standing of why some countries have seen such low - or even negative - levels of
growth, while others have managed to pull large parts of their population out of
poverty during only a few decades. Sachs and Warner (1997b) provide an econo-
metric investigation of the sources of slow growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. Firstly,
they conclude that one do not need ”special” explanations for this continent. The
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factors hindering growth there, are mostly factors that are associated with low
growth also elsewhere in the world. Poor economic policies, such as lack of open-
ness to international markets and trade, the lack of appropriate institutions to
support the market-economy, too little government saving etc., contribute to slow
growth in countries both in Africa and on other continents. Geographical factors,
such as tropical climate, and a large amount of the population not having access
to the sea, are also known obstacles to growth. Though some of these factors are
more prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa than on any other continent, the effects on
growth are also seen elsewhere. Nevertheless, it is clear that factors special to
Sub-Saharan Africa may actually be parts of the explanations behind the prox-
imate hinders of growth. Examples of such factors specific to the continent are
the colonial legacy, and the ethnic divisions that are especially apparent in Africa.
They also conclude that quantitatively, the lack of good institutions and appropri-
ate policies are more important in explaining slow growth, than are geographical
and other ”predetermined” factors. This in some sense gives room for an opti-
mistic view regarding growth in Sub-Saharan Africa; as opposed to the fact that
a country is land-locked, the lack of good policies has the potential to be changed.
As a final note to this section, I would like to emphasize that there are clearly
important factors connected to economic growth and development in Sub-Saharan
Africa that I do not discuss in this thesis. Among them are the high prevalence
of conflict and civil war that has been seen on this continent. I will touch on
this subject superficially in some of the following sections, but mainly I leave
it out of the scope to explore the explanations and consequences of devastating
conflicts in Africa. Furthermore, it is obvious that the terms of trade faced by
African countries, have largely contributed to the lack of growth in many countries.
Though clearly connected to policies implemented in many donor countries of
development aid, I leave this subject to be explored by others.
2.2 Perspectives on Aid, Institutions and Development
To have some ideas of what factors determine economic growth is crucial in trying
to understand why development aid has not managed to create growth in many
countries. If institutions and economic policies are important factors in deter-
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mining whether a country will experience economic growth, it is vital to develop
an understanding of how foreign aid changes - or has the potential to change -
governments, policies and institutions.
In the following, I will touch on some of the mechanisms that have obtained
focus in the economic literature attempting to explain the perceived lack of effec-
tiveness of development aid.
2.2.1 The Samaritan’s Dilemma
Industrialized countries, private companies, NGO’s, and other aid organizations,
might have a large range of underlying reasons for what seems as an attempt to
”help the poor”. The donors do in some cases have more or less hidden economic
motives, there are in many cases international political reasons or a need for ”good-
will” lying behind development aid. Furthermore, as people living in a developed
country, most of us do to some extent get a ”better conscience” knowing that we
at least tried in some small way, to make matters better for people being less lucky
than ourselves. However, at least some of the flows of money reaching developing
countries, could be argued to be given on the basis of some sort of ”altruism”. A
philosophical discussion of whether altruism is something that do in fact exist or
not, is not in place here, but many people - and countries - do seemingly donate
money because they ”want to help”. The change in incentives for some agents
in an economy, caused by such altruism in other agents, and the lack of possi-
bilities to commit to a certain behavior in the future, has been the foundation
for the literature on a phenomenon now known as the ”Samaritan’s dilemma”.
Buchanan (1975) was the first to name this phenomenon or problem, which has
been investigated further by several economists and other social scientists.
Among them is Coate (1995), who develops a theoretical model that shows how
altruism of rich individuals in an economy can create inefficiency through changing
the incentives of poor individuals to buy insurance against a possible future loss.
This model could also be related to development aid, where aid organizations
are the altruistic rich. By changing the incentives of the recipient government,
donors of development aid might actually induce them to not carry out policies
that would enhance the prospects for economic growth. In Coate’s model, there
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are three individuals, two rich and one poor, in addition to a government. The
rich people are altruistic, in the sense that they care about the utility of the poor.
The poor individual is risk-averse, and faces two possible states of nature in the
future, one ”bad” and one ”good”. He has the opportunity to buy insurance
against the bad outcome. Before the outcome for the poor individual is realized,
the rich has the possibility to transfer some amount to him. The government is
at place to collect taxes from the rich, and redistribute to the poor, to remove
the free-rider problem of the two rich people, and thus chooses to redistribute
the optimal amount - according to the utility of the rich people. The inefficiency
occurs because the two rich people also have the opportunity to make transfers
after the outcome has been realized. Because the poor individual knows that if a
bad outcome is realized, he will have further transfers from the rich, his incentives
to buy insurance are weakened. The inefficiency arising here is due to the fact
that the level of ”insurance” is not chosen by the poor itself, but by the two rich
people, who also face a free-rider problem in deciding their transfers after the
outcome is realized. This problem would be removed if the rich had the possibility
to commit to giving no transfer after the outcome is known. Coate also shows that
the government can remove the inefficiency by publicly providing the insurance to
the poor.
The parallel to development aid should be obvious. If the government of a
developing country knows that ”altruistic” aid organizations will increase the as-
sistance in case of ”bad outcomes”, their incentives to reform policy in directions
that would enhance growth, or provide ”insurance” against bad outcomes, are low-
ered. Even though donors of aid might see this problem, it is not clear that they
would be able to commit to not ”helping out”, in the case of a bad outcome, such
as sustained low growth, and high levels of poverty and inequality.
Pedersen (2001) analyzes explicitly how the incentives of recipient governments
can be affected by development aid. His conclusion is that, through the channel
of bad incentives, aid organizations can actually worsen income distribution, and
even increase poverty, by providing development aid. He argues that the recipient
governments adapt in order to ”qualify” for aid, and that these problems might be
even more severe if the aggregate aid budget is perceived as endogenous by these
governments.
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It is clear that incentives of many different agents in a developing country could
be affected by incoming development aid, in ways that are not intended by the
donors. Not only incentives for good policies or policy reforms, but a farmer’s
incentives to take care of his land, parents’ incentives to send their children to
school, the incentives a small-scale business owners to invest in human or real
capital, and so on, might be changed. Even more directly, development aid might
potentially be quite harmful to productive activity. A good illustration of such
adverse effects can be found in Dambisa Moyo’s book ”Dead Aid” (Moyo, 2010,
p. 44);
There’s a mosquito net maker in Africa. He manufactures around
500 nets a week. He employs ten people, who (as with many African
countries) each have to support upwards of fifteen relatives. However
hard they work, they can’t make enough nets to combat the malaria-
carrying mosquito. Enter vociferous Hollywood movie star who rallies
the masses, and goads Western governments to collect and send 100,000
mosquito nets to the aﬄicted region, at a cost of a million dollars. The
nets arrive, the nets are distributed, and a ”good” deed is done. With
the market flooded with foreign nets, however, our mosquito net maker
is promptly put out of business. His ten workers can no longer support
their 150 dependents (who are now forced to depend on handouts), and
one mustn’t forget that in a maximum of five years the majority of the
imported nets will be torn, damaged and of no further use.
This short story illustrates that effort to improve a bad situation - even though
maybe effective in the short run - can have severe consequences in the long run.
Such effects as those described here, are probably in reality mostly connected to
emergency aid, most aid organizations are aware of the danger posed by these sort
of interventions. Still, the story illustrates the fact that the effects of aid are more
complicated then they might seem, and that there clearly exists consequences that
are not intended, and in many cases not foreseen, by the donors.
Finally, it is not difficult to connect Moyo’s story to adverse incentive effects
potentially posed by development aid. It should also be evident that not only does
the foreign mosquito nets put the net maker out of business; frequent interventions
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of this kind would probably teach entrepreneurs like the net maker and his peers,
to not even try to go into business.
2.2.2 The Resource Curse
In the previous section, I briefly discussed adverse effects on incentives potentially
created by development aid. Distorted incentives leading to inefficiency by poor
allocation of resources, occur for a large number of reasons, and in many different
ways. I will here continue this discussion of incentives and resource allocation,
from a slightly different angle.
In the economic literature, it has been recognized for some time that the access
to valuable natural resources is negatively correlated with economic growth. In
the literature, this is commonly referred to as the ”Resource Curse”. There has
been a substantial effort by economists to explain this seemingly paradoxical fact;
that where there are large amounts of natural resources, there is, in general, low
economic growth. Waist of resources to rent-seeking, perverse incentives of policy
makers, deterioration of institutions, and high levels of conflict or war induced
by the access to such values, are among the possible explanations. It is possible
that development aid might work in similar ways as such natural resources. After
all, development aid must also be considered a windfall resource, not directly
dependent on productive activity in the recipient country. If this is the case, to
understand the possible explanations for the ”Curse of natural resources” could
contribute to the understanding of the effects foreign aid has on the recipient
countries and economies.
Sachs and Warner (1997a) and Sachs and Warner (2001) provide empirical evi-
dence of a negative relationship between access to natural resources and economic
growth. In the earliest of these two papers, they find that countries with a high
ratio of natural resources to GDP in 1970, tended to grow slowly during the pe-
riod between 1970 and 1990. They follow up on these results in their paper from
2001, by attempting to summarize results from previous research on the subject.
From this investigation, they consider the evidence in favor of a resource curse
quite strong. Furthermore, they investigate explicitly whether other factors, such
as geographical or climate variables, may explain the negative correlation, and
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find no evidence supporting that hypothesis. As a major explanation of the curse,
Sachs and Warner suggest crowding out of other activities that drive growth. They
argue that countries with high export of natural resources, tend to be high-price
(and thus high cost) countries, and activities such as manufacturing, education
and innovation suffer from this. But as we shall see, this is not the only way
economists have suggested that valuable natural resource exports may adversely
affect an economy.
A review of the most common explanations of the resource curse, by both
economists and political scientists, is provided by Ross (1999). As Sachs and
Warner, he emphasizes out-crowding of other sectors, as an important explanation
from economic literature. The argument is that appreciation of the exporting
country’s real exchange rate leads to capital and labor being drawn away from the
country’s manufacturing and agricultural sector by raising the production costs,
also known as the Dutch Disease. However, Ross points out that this explanation
does not fit all developing states; many of these countries have surplus labor, and
thus resource exports do not necessarily lead to higher wages. In addition, many
countries have other sectors that import intermediate goods, and these sectors
actually benefit from an appreciation.
As other explanations for resources not giving rise to economic growth, pro-
vided by economists, Ross emphasizes the instability of international commodity
markets; giving unpredictability in government revenues and high levels of risk
concerning private investment, and finally; poor linkages between resource and
non-resource sectors, and lastly a decline in the terms of trade for resource ex-
porting countries. Finally, he discusses explanations most commonly provided by
political scientists, mainly connected to political aspects and poor management of
the resources by governments. He divides these into three categories. The first is
”cognitive explanations”; the argument is based on resource wealth causing a type
of myopia of both policy makers and private actors in the economy, giving little
growth in the long run. Secondly, he emphasizes ”societal explanations”, focusing
on how resource booms can give power to non-state actors in the economy that
have incentives of favoring growth-impeding policies. Ross points out that there
is little empirical evidence, and several theoretical problems connected to both
these two types of explanations. The third type of explanation is ”state-centered”.
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Governments in resource rich countries can choose policies that potentially would
give them higher support, but might be hindering growth in the long run. One
example is that the government do not have to extract the same amount of money
through taxes - when export revenues are high - and this could lead to a weaker
link to the society governed, thus decreasing the pressure to provide good policies.
There has generally been a large focus on the political economy that is clearly
connected to natural resources. As suggested also by Ross, effects on both will-
ingness and ability of policy makers to provide sustainable and growth-enhancing
economic policies are potentially severely affected by large windfall resources such
as export of a natural resource. Auty (2001) makes use of and develops a the-
oretical framework for modeling competitive industrialization, in an attempt to
investigate analytically how growth can be affected by natural resources through
the political state. His analysis suggests that what he calls a ”developmental
state” is firstly a necessary condition for growth, and secondly associated with a
poor natural resource endowment. A developmental state to Auty has two im-
portant characteristics; the state has sufficient autonomy to be able to pursue a
sound and coherent economic policy, and the state sees it as its aim to raise welfare
in the society in the long run. He argues that large values in natural resources
undermines these two characteristics because scarce resources is necessary to put
pressure on the government to allocate the resources efficiently, and thus promotes
investment in human and social capital, and promotes efficient markets. In ad-
dition, pressure on land and other resources creates low tolerance in the whole
society for rent extraction and redistribution to a small minority. Countries with
large natural resources are also, according to Auty, more prone to promote policies
that hinder international trade - which again will hinder growth in the long run -
because they could experience Dutch Disease effects. These effects on incentives of
the policy makers together might lead to failure of the government to implement
sustainable policies that would promote economic growth, when they have access
to high revenues from a natural resource.
Robinson et al. (2006) take a similar approach, by building a model of resource
extraction, to try to explain the ”curse”. They investigate whether resource booms
can trigger incentives for policy makers that might have negative effects on growth
and development. Based on their analytical framework, they argue that incentives
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related to re-election can lead to dysfunctional state behavior; some examples are
over-extraction of the resource, and inefficient levels of redistribution to influence
elections. Their model also emphasizes the importance of the quality of institu-
tions, because high quality institutions might limit the ability of politicians to
implement policies and redistribute wealth in ways that are destructive for devel-
opment.
As already mentioned briefly; when there is a potential for very high revenues,
there is also potentially a higher risk of large amounts of resources being allocated
into ”redistribution” of these revenues, through rent-seeking or grabbing. Torvik
(2002) develops a model where an exogenous increase in income - in his model
perceived as coming from export of a natural resource - results in a decrease in the
number of entrepreneurs engaged in productive firms because rent-seeking becomes
more profitable. Torvik shows that the decrease in income due to less productive
activity may be higher than the exogenous increase in income, and thus the nat-
ural resource export may lead to a drop in aggregate income. Quite similarly,
Baland and Francois (2000) investigate under what conditions resource booms in-
duce increases in rent-seeking activities, and under what conditions it leads to
increased entrepreneurship, by the use of theoretical modeling. Using their ana-
lytical framework, the authors conclude that whether an increase in income from
a natural resource leads to increased rent-seeking activity or not, depends on the
initial situation - or equilibrium - in the economy. An economy with low levels of
entrepreneurial activity initially, might see increased levels of rent-seeking activity
as a result of a resource boom. This theoretical framework can also contribute
to the understanding of extensive differences in outcomes between economies that
seem quite similar, due to the multiple equilibria possible.
It should be obvious - and Torvik also explicitly mentions this in his paper
- that development aid flowing into a country might have similar effects on the
economy as a natural resource. Export revenues from natural resources and foreign
aid are similar ”phenomena” in the sense that they are sources of income that do
not arise directly from productive activity in the economy. Neither do any of the
two income sources to a high extent depend on whether policy makers make the
”right” choices. It is a paradox that valuable resources in so many cases do not
decrease poverty, but scientists or economists can still not overlook the resource
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curse. Similarly, both scientists and aid organizations are obliged not to disregard
and ignore possible effects of the same kind, of development aid.
Lastly, it has been argued that whether a natural resource is a curse to a country
or not, depends crucially on the quality of the country’s institutions. Norway is
of course a prominent example of a country that did not experience high levels of
rent-seeking, increased corruption, deterioration of other institutions, or civil war,
as a consequence of discovering large values in the form of oil and natural gas. It
is clear that already existing sound economic policies, low levels of poverty, the
ability to enforce property rights, and high quality of institutions on many levels,
can contribute to the explanation of the way our small country has handled its
natural resources.
Mehlum et al. (2006) investigates analytically how the effects of resource abun-
dance is connected to the country’s institutions. They also test the predictions
of their model empirically, and their results suggest that different quality of in-
stitutions is an important determinant to whether countries are able to generate
development when they get access to values from natural resources. Boschini et al.
(2007) also show by empirical investigation that the impact of a natural resource
on growth does depend on the quality of institutions. Besides this, their results
indicate that the interaction between resources and institutions is also highly de-
pendent on the type of resource the country has access to.
If it is so that a country to some extent needs to be ”developed” to avoid the
resource curse, and that development aid might also be ”cursed” in a similar way
as natural resources, it is maybe not so paradoxical after all that development aid
does not do the trick in creating economic growth. By its means, development
aid is in most cases transferred to countries that are not developed; the recipient
countries might not be able to use such flows to create growth, in stead the aid
potentially results in rent-seeking, corruption and deterioration of policies and
institutions.
2.2.3 Institutions, Policy and Development Aid
In the last section, I discussed how export of natural resources have been seen
to correlate negatively with economic growth. I also argued that one cannot rule
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out the possibility that development aid might work in similar ways as income
from natural resources. Among the proposed explanations for the curse of natural
resources, was the potentially negative effects of a windfall resource (such as a
natural resource or development aid) on institutions and policies in the recipient
country. In this and the following sections, I will look specifically at how develop-
ment aid might be influencing and interacting with policy makers and economic
policies, institutions, and incentives for rent-seeking. Finally, I will discuss some
possible macroeconomic effects of foreign aid.
Sound institutions and economic policies are probably crucial for economic
growth in developing countries. If development aid undermines such institutions
and policies, or hinders reform that would improve their quality, the consequence
would be that foreign aid may obstruct growth. Djankov et al. (2008) empirically
investigate whether they can find support for the hypothesis that development aid,
as a windfall resource, may result in a ”resource curse”, using panel data for 108
countries receiving foreign aid in the period 1960-1999. Specifically, they assess
the impact of foreign aid on institutions in the recipient country. Their results
strongly suggest that there is a negative impact of aid on institutions. In their
sample, the countries receiving the 10 % highest rates of foreign aid to GDP, see a
0.5 to 1 point decrease on a 10-point democracy index, which is a large effect. As a
comparison, they do a similar analysis of effects of oil rents on political institutions,
and conclude that ”aid is a bigger curse than oil” (Djankov et al., 2008, p. 169).
As mentioned also by Ross (1999) discussed above, Schwalbenberg (1998) also
argues - with basis in a theoretical model - that to increase its political support,
a government receiving foreign aid will reduce taxation of the rich population
(either by lowering tax rates directly, or by giving subsidies to specific groups),
which increases support for the regime. As is well-known, taxes are distortionary,
so Schwalbenberg does not conclude that this tax reduction is necessarily a ”bad”
policy. However, the model shows that incoming flows of aid may at least change
economic policies. Potentially, lower tax levels can lead to lower accountability of
the government towards its citizens, and thus reduce the pressure on the govern-
ment to perform policy reform, and redistribute in a manner that would gain the
economic development in the country. When testing the predictions of his model
empirically, Schwalbenberg finds, however, little significant evidence suggesting a
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strong connection between foreign aid and distortionary economic policies. His
empirical results do thus stand in opposition to those of Djankov et al. (2008).
The findings of Schwalbenberg also contradict the results of Knack (2001), who by
by using his findings from cross-country data allege a strong negative relationship
between aid levels and quality of governance. Knack measures quality of gover-
nance by indices of bureaucratic quality, corruption, and the rule of law, from the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The coefficients on aid are negative,
and they are also highly significant. When foreign aid is removed from the regres-
sion, the R2 is significantly lowered, suggesting that aid explains a large part of the
variation in the government quality variables, in Knack’s sample. When instru-
menting for aid to control for possible reverse causality, the relationship between
aid and governance actually seems to be strengthened. Furthermore, Knack’s re-
sults do not provide evidence that the initial condition of government quality is
essential.
Knack also reviews earlier empirical evidence on the relationship between for-
eign aid and the quality of governance, and concludes that (Knack, 2001, p. 314);
this evidence on balance provides support for the more pessimistic [the-
oretical] predictions regarding aid’s impact
In attempting to understand the underlying mechanisms behind this empirical
relationship, Knack emphasizes five important factors. Firstly, he argues that
the governments’ accountability might be weakened when they have access to
foreign aid. As I have mentioned earlier in this discussion, many governments
use the opportunity to relief the tax pressure, and to subsidize groups to gain
their political support. This creates a weaker link between the population and the
government. Such changes in tax policy, and the lack of immediate pressure on
resources, may reduce the pressure on the government to reform inefficient policies
and institutions. Furthermore, as I have mentioned several times already, foreign
aid encourages spending of resources on rent-seeking, and corruption. Even worse,
aid funds may create devastating conflict over control.
Leaving aside the economic institutions, and looking specifically at the fiscal
behavior of governments, Khan and Hoshino (1992), provide an empirical investi-
gation of how development aid affects policies in five South and Southeast Asian
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countries. Specifically, they consider public investment, public spending and tax-
ation. They argue on the basis of their results that aid is taken as an increase
in income, and leads to an increase in consumption. Furthermore, the average
propensity to consume seems to be less than one, thus there is also some increase
in investment. This increase in investment is however highly dependent on whether
the foreign aid is given as a grant or a loan. Investment is higher when the recipient
country is given a loan, suggesting that quite different incentives are in place when
the country is expected to repay at a later point in time. Supporting this view,
evidence also shows that taxation is increased in the case of loans, while lowered
by grants.
Several others have investigated how policy and institutions are affected by
development aid. Brautigam and Knack (2004) emphasize the fact that good
governance is a public good, and thus there are too low incentives to provide it,
since the benefits are non-selective. They discuss both the impact of aid on the
quality of governance in general, and how aid delivered in different ways might give
different results. When testing their hypotheses concerning these issues, they find
a robust statistical relationship between high levels of foreign aid and deterioration
of governance in Africa. In this paper, high quality governance includes a well-
functioning bureaucracy, adherence to the rule of law, low levels of corruption,
and good and sustainable management of the generation of public expenditure
and revenue. Based on the evidence, Bra¨utigam and Knack also conclude that
high levels of aid are strongly related to lower rates of taxes to GDP, with effects
such as those discussed above. Although the empirical framework of Bra¨utigam
and Knack is not explicitly designed to establish strong causal relationships, their
results suggest that some ways to transfer development aid might have detrimental
effects on the recipient economy.
Moss et al. (2006) provide a review of earlier literature from economists and
political scientists on effects of aid on institutions and policies, and one of their
conclusions based on empirical evidence is exactly that aid might decrease the
need of the government to collect taxes, which subsequently lowers their need to
maintain legitimacy. The authors argue that such states are less likely to develop
good institutions.
A further investigation of foreign aid and governance in Africa is provided by
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Goldsmith (2001). In opposition to the main conclusions of most of the papers
discussed above, he finds little evidence in support of severe negative consequences
of aid on the quality of governance, measured by Goldsmith as the ”ability to make
collective decisions democratically and to produce a capitalist institutional and
legal framework” (Goldsmith, 2001, p.124). However, neither can his results be
said to show that development aid has strong positive impact on these measures.
One specific area often discussed in connection to the effects of development
aid on governance and institutions, is corruption. Though it is not clear that
all kinds of corruption hinder economic development and growth, high levels of
corruption do have the potential to be severely damaging. Mauro (1995) is among
the empirical investigations concluding that high levels of corruption are strongly
associated with low levels of economic growth. Of course, the direction of causality
is not necessarily obvious here, but still; if foreign aid can lead to higher levels of
corruption, donors should clearly be aware of this.
One paper suggesting that there might potentially be a causal relationship from
inflows of development aid to corruption, is Andvig and Moene (1990). Andvig
and Moene do not primarily focus on aid, but they build a theoretical model in
order to explain how there might be several (self-fulfilling) equilibrium levels of
corruption in an economy. On the basis of their model, they argue that when the
”personal cost” of partaking in a corrupt act is different for different individuals in
the economy, and because of this, shifts in exogenous variables such as the benefits
from corruption or the punishment if being caught, might shift the economy from
one equilibrium to another. Potentially, high levels of development aid flowing into
a developing country, might thus move the economy from an equilibrium with a
low level of corruption, to an equilibrium with a high level.
Tavares (2003) investigates the relationship between foreign aid and corruption
empirically. Using indicators of the recipient country’s geographical and cultural
proximity to OECD donor countries, in interaction with the outflows from these
OECD countries, as instrument for aid, Tavares actually finds a negative effect
of aid on corruption. To the contrary, empirical results from Alesina and Weder
(1999) suggest the opposite relationship. However, Alesina and Weder mainly
investigates whether donors favor countries with lower levels of corruption, so no
strong conclusion can be drawn from this.
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Clearly, development aid is connected to governance and economic policies and
institutions in a complex manner. The scientific attempts to understand the rela-
tionship does to some extent give differing answers, and it should be obvious that
the effects depend crucially on characteristics of the recipient country, and on how
the foreign aid enters the economy. However, those mentioned here, and other con-
tributions from economic literature, should provide us with caution regarding the
multifaceted ways in which our ”aim to help” might affect the recipient economies
in ways not intended by the donors.
2.2.4 Development Aid and Rent-Seeking
In the preceding section, I have discussed how policies and institutions might be
affected by development aid. These effects work mainly through changed incentives
of policy makers. Obviously, aid do not only have the potential to give perverse
incentives to policy makers, but also to change incentives of private actors in the
economy. Larger incentives for private or public actors in the economy to spend
resources on rent-seeking or grabbing might be very harmful in an economy where
resources are in from the outset relatively scarce. Increased amounts of resources
allocated to rent-seeking was one of the possible explanations of the resource curse,
that I mentioned in section 2.2.2 If revenues from export of a natural resource can
increase rent-seeking activity, foreign aid flowing into a developing country could
potentially have similar effects. Svensson (2000) uses this approach in a game-
theoretical attempt to explain why the effects of aid on development seem to be
so poor. One implication from his model is that the provision of public goods -
and productive public spending - may be lowered by the increase in government
revenue by foreign aid. Svensson also argues, on the basis of the model, that
even the expectation of a windfall resource such as aid, might have similar effects.
In addition to this analytical contribution, Svensson offers empirical evidence,
suggesting that aid might give higher levels of corruption.
Murphy et al. (1993) offer a contribution to the understanding of how rent-
seeking - that might result from, or be increased by, revenues from for example
development aid - is so harmful to economic growth and development. They em-
phasize two reasons why this type of activity might have severe negative conse-
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quences. Firstly, they argue that rent-seeking activities exhibit increasing returns
to scale, which might give several equilibria in levels of rent-seeking. Rent-seekers
have a ”strength in numbers”, because of lowered probability of getting caught,
and due to the fact that such offenses in itself creates demand for new offenses.
A relatively small increase in rent-seeking might thus lead the economy onto a
path with continuing increases in non-productive activity, and eventually to a new
equilibrium where much less resources are allocated to productive purposes. Es-
pecially, their model shows that even though both production and rent-seeking
exhibit diminishing returns technologies, the relative returns from rent-seeking
may increase in the activity itself. Secondly, Murphy et al. point to the fact that
especially public rent-seeking, is likely to be more harmful to innovative activity
than directly to production. Innovative activity is crucial to development in a
somewhat longer time perspective, thus such effects might be important in order
to understand the lack of growth in some developing countries.
I have until now primarily focused on contributions from the literature regard-
ing potential effects of development aid that can be explained by microeconomic
reasoning. In the next section, I will briefly discuss some macroeconomic effects
of foreign aid flowing into a developing country.
2.3 Macroeconomic Instability
Large inflows of money to a country; from foreign investors, export revenues,
development aid etc., might potentially have adverse effects on the macro economy.
Such flows may lead to a real appreciation of the domestic currency, to higher levels
of inflation, to crowding out of specific sectors and so on. Whether these effects
are destructive to economic growth of course depends on a whole range of factors,
among them; whether the speed of the changes is too high, whether the recipient
economy has the possibility to adapt to the changes, and whether the changes at
some point in time have to be reversed. Both in Asia and Latin America there have
been large crises, with galloping levels of inflation, and economies out of control.
Especially the East Asian crisis in the 1990s has been attributed to financial and
capital market liberalization, and the instability that followed.
Capital flows from foreign countries into an economy take many different forms.
23
They range from multilateral aid transfers, through government lending (issuing
of government bonds) and bank loans, to Foreign Direct Investment. The different
characteristics of such flows result in different consequences for the recipient econ-
omy. Largely volatile short-term speculation flows of course affects the economy
in ways different from for example Foreign Direct Investment, that has been seen
to be of a much more stable and long-lasting character. Stiglitz (2000) reviews the
main arguments for and against capital market liberalization. His discussion gives
some important insights into what effects one can expect from incoming flows as
a result of such liberalization. Because the effects of flows that are more volatile,
are the most unclear, Stiglitz focuses his analysis mainly on such flows; flows that
are speculative and short-term.
There are, according to Stiglitz, two important ways in which one would ex-
pect capital market liberalization to enhance economic growth. Firstly, one could
expect efficiency to be increased by the opening up for foreign investment inside
the country, or domestic investment in businesses outside the country. This is
the obvious analogy to opening up for trade; capital should go where it is most
productive, and should not be hindered by sovereign borders. To some degree,
competition for funds should increase the efficiency and innovation in domestic
firms, and create an economic environment that is attractive to investors. Sec-
ondly, open capital markets give a new possibility for diversification of risk, that
could work stabilizing on the economy.
Stiglitz criticizes all these arguments to some extent, but mainly, he argues
that liberalization of capital markets creates instability, rather than stability. He
emphasizes that capital markets are in important ways different from standard
goods markets, and this leads to other effects of open capital markets, than those
seen from ordinary opening for trade in goods and services. The main difference
is, according to Stiglitz, the large lack and asymmetry of information in capital
markets. This leads to foreign investment being highly procyclical, thus increasing
the macroeconomic instability experienced by the countries receiving the flows.
Subsequently, the increased instability discourages further investment, and this
could be harmful to growth in the developing economy. Stiglitz’s arguments are
coherent with the fact that when capital markets have opened, one have seen
increasing levels of capital flowing out of developing countries, as opposed to the
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predictions from economic theory where the lack of capital in these countries should
create opportunities for high returns on investments.
Corbo and Hernandez (1996) provide a comprehensive overview of the typical
macroeconomic effects of capital inflows, related to the Mexican crisis in December
1994. They investigate the experiences from four Latin American, and five East
Asian countries from 1986 to 1993. The effects they emphasize are appreciation
of the real exchange rate, larger trade deficits, and very high levels of inflation in
countries with fixed exchange rates.
Clearly, the experiences of several developing countries, suggest that inflows
of foreign capital do not only increase productivity and efficiency by leading to
investment in sectors with high returns.
Potentially, development aid flowing into a developing economy might have
adverse effects similar to those discussed above. Younger (1992) considers this
hypothesis, by looking directly at inflows of capital from donors of development
aid. Two main macroeconomic problems surface in his investigation. Firstly,
such flows might give a large appreciation of the real exchange rate, and this
often happens through domestic inflation rather than appreciation of the nominal
exchange rate. Secondly, and of course connected to this, the private sector might
be crowded out as a result of the inflows. Since the government is most often
the recipient of development aid, the aggregate demand for domestic goods and
services is increased, and this leads to higher costs in all sectors. Younger also
argues that both these problems have been seen in Ghana, which has been a large
recipient of foreign aid. However, Younger emphasizes that whether these changes
are purely negative to domestic economic growth is not clear. The most important
factor here is whether the flows of capital into the country are relatively stable or
not. The serious problems surface when a recipient country faces large declines in
inflows, that forces a reversal of the changes in the domestic economy.
2.4 Does Development Aid Create Growth?
In the preceding, I have discussed different ways development aid might affect
economic growth and development, and mainly ways that are not necessarily in-
tended - or even foreseen - by the donors. Firstly, I focused on development aid in
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Sub-Saharan Africa, and the general economic situation on this continent. I then
moved on to how development aid might affect institutions, policies and resource
allocation, touching on both the Samaritan’s Dilemma and the Resource Curse, as
potential pitfalls for aid donors. Lastly, I mentioned some macroeconomic effects
that have been seen to follow from flows of development aid.
It is clear from the preceding discussion that development aid affects the re-
cipient economies in many different ways, and that many consequences of such
flows are neither desired, nor predicted, by the donors. When the Marshall Plan
and the recovery of Europe after World War II is set aside, the historical empirics
cannot be said to support those arguing that aid is the way to create development.
Even though one should probably not totally discard the opportunities of creating
a world with smaller differences through redistributing between rich and poor by
development aid, there should be a larger focus on other ways in which the poor
countries of today could manage to create economic growth and development.
At the same time, it is obvious that there is a large need for capital to finance
the building of infrastructure, institutions, education etc. in many countries of
the world today. So the question is then whether there are other sources of such
financing that might ”work better” than development aid has been seen to do. One
possibility would be for these countries to borrow money in commercial capital
markets. Could this way of financing government spending and investment create
other - and maybe better - incentives for agents in the developing economy, that
would give better preconditions for economic growth?
I will attempt to give some indications of the answers to these questions, but
firstly, I will in the next chapter discuss some characteristics of international capital
markets.
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3 Alternative Financing of Development
A number of developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa must be said to
be dependent on development aid. Some countries have for several decades covered
substantial parts of their public budgets through foreign aid (see examples in
section 2). This dependency - leading to potential pressure from donors influencing
decisions and policies, and lack of autonomy for the recipients of development aid -
might be seen as a heavy weight by both governments and the general population
in these countries. From the discussion in section 2, it is clear that there are
potentially a whole range of damaging effects of the large amounts of aid flowing
into these economies.
However, there is an obvious need for finance in many developing countries.
Investment in infrastructure, human and real capital etc., is highly necessary to
spur development. Furthermore, policy reform, the building of strong institu-
tions, and the development of profitable and sustainable industries may be costly,
and difficult to accomplish with budgets only built on domestic revenue. Thus,
the emerging question is whether there are alternative possibilities for developing
country governments to finance these investments in future development.
One obvious way to raise funds is for countries to borrow money in interna-
tional capital markets. In principle, governments can issue government bonds,
and with a promise to repay, foreign money can be used to finance whatever is
needed. Potentially, this might be an opportunity for countries highly dependent
on development aid, to get rid of this dependency.
If a developing country government perceives inflows from commercial loans
as less harmful to the economy than developing aid, there might be several ways
in which positive effects of reducing aid-dependency might be self-enhancing. Not
only may a transition from being an aid-recipient to being a borrower in commercial
markets have positive effects through reducing problems directly connected to aid
flows, it might also affect the economy more indirectly. When budgets depend
on such loans - rather than grants or loans with long repayment periods and low
interest rates - there is evidently a more heavy pressure on governments to create
economic environments that foster productivity and efficiency. When loans shall
be repaid, and defaults have more severe consequences, the money must be used
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in ways that makes repayment possible. Furthermore, to get access to such loans,
the country must to some extent have financial markets that are well-functioning,
and development of these markets might in itself support domestic productivity
and economic growth.
Levine (1997) investigates the quantitative relationship between financial de-
velopment and economic growth, and his results suggest that there is a complex
relationship between the two. There seems to be a positive correlation between
growth rates and the development of the financial system, and this might not be
caused only by financial development following economic growth. Levine argues
that enhancement of the financial system might in itself contribute to growth.
There is also reason to believe that when foreign investors put their money
in government bonds in a developing country, this might increase the amounts of
other types of capital inflows reaching the country and the economy. If the lack
of capital - and low levels of investment - is a determining factor to low growth,
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), as an example of such flows, might be growth-
promoting. I will return to this in the following.
However, is there reason to believe that the challenges discussed in the first
chapter of this thesis, will not be the same when the inflows of money are commer-
cial loans rather than development aid? My hypothesis is that the answer to this
question is yes; for several reasons, there might be less adverse effects of inflows
when these are commercial. In the following, I will put forward some arguments
for why I believe this might be the case. Firstly, I will relate the discussion to
the specific issues discussed in the last chapter. Following this, I will discuss some
contributions from economic literature on the effects on developing economies of
inflows of foreign capital - and the development and opening up of financial markets
- in general.
3.1 Capital Inflows to Developing Countries
The first problem of development aid, discussed in section 2.2, was The Samaritan’s
Dilemma. The ”altruism” of the developed world might lead to a lack of incentives
for developing country governments to implement policies and build institutions
that promote growth and development. Not only governments, but also other
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agents in the economy, might be affected by adverse incentives when there are
continuing flows of development aid entering the economy. Regional authorities,
and even members of the general population, might see the gains of putting effort
into improving their own situation as smaller, when they expect international aid
organizations to step in if they don’t. If the sovereign government perceives such
effects as realistic, they might see a reduction of the inflows of aid as beneficial.
This is possibly the most obvious argument in favor of an advantage of commercial
loans compared to development aid. In international capital markets, there are no
Samaritans; no investors will be willing to lend to countries that defaults on their
loans, or to offer money simply because the state is bad in the country demanding
loans.
The hypothesis of the second part of section 2.2 was that development aid
might have similar effects as other windfall resources, that are statistically seen
to impair economic growth and development. It is clear that also other types
of foreign capital inflows could potentially have the same effects. However, one
might argue that when foreign investors buy government bonds from the central
bank in a developing country, they are kindly aware of such dangers, and will keep
their money out of countries that are highly corrupt, experience vast conflict, or
are expected to use it inefficiently. Some of the proposed explanations for the
Resource Curse were also connected to the reduced scarcity of resources, and the
potential for ”waste” of resources that this creates. It is possible that such adverse
effects are lower when the money has to be repaid with interest rates. The pressure
from the population on the policy makers to make efficient use of resources, and
to not engage in unproductive redistributive activities, are possibly less affected
by the inflows when they are not grants that will never be paid back.
There might also be similar differences between commercial loans and develop-
ment aid regarding the influence on policies, institutions, and resources allocated
to rent-seeking, discussed in 2.2.3 and 2.2.4. As an example, reduced accountabil-
ity of the government and the policymakers, due to lower levels of taxation - and
thus a less clear ”responsibility” of the government towards its citizens - might
not be an appearing problem when the government needs to collect taxes in order
to be able to repay the loans. The results of Khan and Hoshino (1992), that I
mentioned in the discussion of how aid might affect policies and institutions in
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2.2.3, support this view. Though they look only at different forms of development
aid, their findings suggest that investment is higher, and the reduction in tax lev-
els are lower (they even see increased tax rates), when aid comes in the form of
loans rather than grants. Potentially, the differences would be even larger if one
compared development aid grants with commercial loans.
3.1.1 Effects of Capital Inflows
Reisen and Soto (2001) investigates the effects on growth in developing countries
of different types of foreign capital inflows. They review analytical arguments
from the literature in this area, in addition to providing empirical evidence on the
subject, using panel data from 44 countries in the period from 1986 to 1997. They
distinguish between four types of flows; Foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio
equity investment, bond flows and short- and long-term bank lending. The authors
suggest several ways in which inflows may be beneficial to the recipient economy.
They emphasize firstly that foreign capital might add to domestic savings, and
increase investment, and thus increase the level of capital and total production
(to refer to the standard Solow-framework). Furthermore, it might raise efficiency
in the recipient economy, through interaction with human capital, the reduction
of capital costs for local entrepreneurs, and enhanced competition. In addition,
consumption risks can be lowered. On the other hand, Reisen and Soto identify
two important channels through which foreign capital flows can create risk in the
recipient economy. Firstly, it might increase losses from distortion in consumption
patterns. This is especially evident when the flows are largely volatile. Secondly
such flows might generate output loss and bankruptcies, again due to volatility in
the flows, and abrupt reversibility.
The empirical results of Reisen and Soto suggest that both FDI and portfolio
equity investment do in fact stimulate long-term growth. FDI is seen to increase
investment and contribute to smoothing intertemporal consumption levels. Port-
folio equity inflows lowers the cost of equity capital, but has a higher degree of
reversibility than does FDI. The authors conclude that ”authorities are right to
prioritize the encouragement of capital inflows” (Reisen and Soto, 2001, p.12).
In an earlier paper (Soto, 2000), Soto conducts a similar empirical investigation.
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Also here, the conclusion is that FDI is positively correlated with growth, also when
controlling for other variables traditionally used in growth analysis (to attempt to
establish a causal relationship and show that the results are not only due to FDI
going to countries with higher growth). Soto emphasizes that the low volatility
in FDI is beneficial to the recipient country, because FDI, due to this, represents
a smaller threat to the macroeconomic stability of the economy. In this paper,
Soto points out that well-functioning financial institutions are important for a
developing country to be able to benefit from foreign capital inflows. He also
emphasizes the increase in the willingness of foreign investors to enter the economy
when transparency standards are higher. These reflections support the view that
positive effects of less dependency on aid might be enhanced if the economy relies
in stead more heavily on commercial foreign capital, because the policy makers
must then provide effort to develop these institutions.
In discussing the entrance of a developing country government on the interna-
tional capital market by bond issuing, the effects of other flows such as FDI should
also be considered. I will get back to risk assessment and some other features of
this market below. However, it should be mentioned here that the probability of
private investors entering an economy through for example FDI, might depend on
to what extent the government has accessed the market issuing sovereign bonds.
If the government takes measures to decrease the perceived risk for investors of
buying sovereign bonds, this can highly influence the assessed risk of other activ-
ities in the economy, such as FDI. FDI - as an additional support for growth -
might then be added value when the government decides to enter the market. As
suggested by both papers discussed above, there is indeed reason to believe that
FDI is a kind of foreign capital inflow that is less harmful, and has higher potential
to spur growth, than several other types of capital inflows.
An empirical investigation provided by Borensztein et al. (1998) support this
view. Using panel data from 69 developing countries in the 1980’s and 90’s, they
find that FDI contributes relatively more to growth in developing countries than
do domestic investment. The authors argue that the contribution to technology-
transfers, and higher factor productivity of foreign firms, are important factors in
explaining these findings. However, the results of Borensztein et al. also suggest
that some quantity of human capital - giving the economy the possibility to absorb
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the inflowing capital - is necessary for the recipient country to see such positive
effects of FDI.
Using data from the 1990’s, and instrumenting in several ways for the FDI
variable, Ram and Zhang (2002) also find a positive relationship between FDI and
growth, and argue that this is not only a result of FDI flowing into countries with
higher growth rates. Ram and Zhang emphasize among other factors technology
transfers, increased competition, and several types of spillovers, as explanations
for their results.
3.1.2 The Lucas Paradox
As a final note to this brief discussion on capital flows reaching developing coun-
tries, I will look at some findings by economists who have studied the actual pat-
terns of such flows over the last decades. Though out of the scope for this thesis,
there are some paradoxical discoveries that should at least be mentioned. Neo-
classical theory, and the standard Solow framework, tell us that in less developed
countries with low levels of capital due to little domestic saving and investment,
the marginal productivity of capital should be high, and when markets are opened,
capital should flow from industrialized countries into these economies. In the real
world, however, the pattern does not seem to be this simple. Lucas (1990) pointed
out that the flows of capital from rich too poor countries are considerably lower
than what is predicted by economic theory. This finding was thus named ”The
Lucas Paradox”. Overall, the net flows are actually going out of developing coun-
tries.
Prasad et al. (2006) use an empirical approach in an attempt to characterize the
patterns and consequences of capital flows between rich and poor countries. The
Lucas Paradox is supported by their findings; more capital is flowing from poor
to rich countries than the other way. Furthermore, over the preceding decades,
this trend has been strengthened; the average per capita income of countries with
surpluses on their current account has been declining. The authors also investigate
the relationship between the current account balance and growth rates. Their
somewhat surprising result is that even when controlling for standard growth-
variables, net inflows of capital to developing countries do not have positive effects
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on growth. In other words; the Lucas Paradox does not seem to hinder growth.
As an explanation suggested for this finding, they argue that many developing
countries do not have the proper markets, policies and institutions to be able to
absorb inflowing capital in a way that would support growth. However, this is not
to say that no developing countries could benefit from foreign capital. They also
find that FDI follows growth quite closely. This suggests better opportunities for
such investment in countries with higher growth rates, but it could also implicate
that FDI does in fact contribute to growth, as suggested by some of the authors
mentioned above.
Following up on this, Prasad et al. have also further investigated the relation-
ship between foreign capital and growth, also distinguishing between the effects in
industrialized and in developing countries (Prasad et al., 2007). They again con-
firm the Lucas Paradox, and the fact that countries relying to a lower extent on
foreign capital, do not seem to grow slower than those receiving higher amounts of
foreign capital. The additional contribution here, is connected to the results when
they also look at industrialized countries. In these countries, the effects of for-
eign capital seem to be more adherent to the textbook economic theory; increased
investment by foreign investors does give higher growth rates. These findings sup-
port the hypothesis that some institutions must be in place for a country to ”make
use of” the benefits potentially inherent in higher levels of foreign investment.
In this section, I have up until now discussed possible benefits for develop-
ing countries of reducing their aid-dependency by accessing international capital
markets, and replacing at least some of the foreign aid they receive with commer-
cial loans. However, gaining access to these markets is not necessarily very easy
for a developing country. To see this more clearly, I will in the following give a
brief overview of how these markets function, with a special emphasis on how the
riskiness of different assets is evaluated.
3.2 Commercial International Capital Markets
In principle, every country, business or private person can collect money in interna-
tional capital markets, from foreign investors. However, there might not always be
investors interested in a particular asset, or potential investors may demand very
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high interest rates. One reason for this would be that the perceived riskiness of
the asset is high. This might be a challenge for sovereign states, or central banks,
interested in issuing bonds in such international markets. Assets from the so-called
”emerging markets” - bonds or stocks issued by governments or businesses in de-
veloping countries - are perceived to have higher risks than many assets issued in
industrialized markets. Especially - sovereign bonds from many developing coun-
tries are considered much more risky than sovereign bonds from for example the
Norwegian or European Central Bank. How the riskiness of a government bond
is assessed is thus crucial to whether a country at all will get the possibility to
collect capital in these markets, and if it does, what price must be paid.
At the time this thesis is written, the situation of several European countries is
quite special. I will not discuss this further, but the interest rates of government
debt from the PIIGS-countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain), is a
good illustration of what happens when investors perceive the risk to be increas-
ing. The only possibility for these countries when they need further loans is to
ask the European Union - or other possible lenders - to give them ”emergency
loans”; conventional borrowing is impossible under circumstances where default is
considered not to be unlikely.
To develop a superficial understanding of how investors assess the riskiness
of sovereign bonds, I will briefly look into some scientific contributions in this
area. There are principally three large rating agencies that provide ratings of
assets - both government bonds, stocks, and other types. These agencies are
Moody’s, Fitch Ratings and Standard & Poor’s. They assign ratings to different
assets, typically in the form of some letter codes such as AAA (the highest credit
quality in the FitchRatings system), or C (assigned by FitchRatings to assets with
exceptionally high levels of credit risk), and are meant as measures of relative
risk. Especially in emerging markets - where investors themselves are in lack of
knowledge, and have few means to assess riskiness themselves - the ratings provided
by these agencies may to a large extent be determinant in what risk the assets are
perceived by the investors to exhibit.
Cantor and Packer (1996) provide an empirical analysis investigating firstly
which factors are important in determining the credit ratings on sovereign bonds,
and secondly, to what extent these ratings affect the yields on those bonds. They
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focus on bonds issued in foreign currency, arguing that even though there has been
seen increased demand for investments in local currency, foreign currency ratings
are still the most important. They investigate the explanatory power of several
variables, such as per capita income, GDP growth etc., on the ratings given by
Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, and find that their right hand side variables
explain a large part of the variation in ratings. Following this, they carry out a
similar analysis of how much of the variation in the yields of the bonds that can be
explained by the same variables, and their results suggest large explanatory power
of the same variables also in this regression. On this basis - and on the basis of
relatively high correlation between bond yields and ratings - they conclude that
ratings do quite strongly affect yields. The observed correlation is of course also
due to the fact that investors themselves look to the same variables as the rating
agencies when they assess risk, but this is according to Cantor and Packer not
the whole story. When they look at changes in bond yields following changes
in the assigned credit ratings, they find that yields follow the ratings when they
change, supporting the view that investors do in fact look to the rating agencies’
assessments. Larrain et al. (1997) also present empirical evidence supporting this
view. They argue on the basis of their results, that credit ratings have a significant
impact in the financial markets.
Furthermore, most institutional investors probably require an official rating be-
fore investing either in stocks or bonds in emerging markets. Thus, to understand
what determines the interest rates paid by developing-country governments when
issuing bonds, and the overall possibility of these countries to enter the markets,
one should investigate how the ratings are set.
A whole range of variables potentially affect the ratings obtained by sovereign
bond issuers. The findings of Cantor and Packer (1996) mentioned above, are based
on regressions with per capita income, GDP growth, inflation, federal deficit/fiscal
balance, current account balance, external debt, a dummy variable indicating
whether the country is classified as industrialized or not by the International Mon-
etary Fund, and a dummy for ”default history” (indicating whether the country
has defaulted after 1970), as left hand side variables. And as already mentioned,
the results suggest that these variables in fact explain a large part of the variation
in ratings. Other variables used in a similar investigation provided by Feder and
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Uy (1985), are the average exports growth rates, and dummy variables indicat-
ing political turmoil and oil exports. Edwards (1984) also proposes the average
propensity to import, the frequency of devaluation, and the rate of government
expenditure to GNP, as additional variables potentially affecting the ratings.
Intuitively, the importance of the issuer’s willingness to repay a loan is much
more important in risk-assessment when the issuer is a sovereign state, than when
it is a private person or a business. There is no international authority that
has the ability to force a sovereign government to pay its debt, or to incur harsh
punishment if the issuer chooses not to repay. Though the international community
has the opportunity to use different kinds of sanctions towards a country not
standing by its obligations, the possibilities of the lender in such a situation is
quite limited in most cases. This is obviously even more important when loans
are issued in the domestic currency, giving the government the opportunity to
reduce the real size of the loan by a devaluation. However, when devaluation is
regarded as likely, the willingness to give loans in domestic currency is probably
very small, and most of my discussion here is thus placed on bonds issued in some
other currency than the domestic.
All three agencies mentioned above share some information on how the ratings
are set. It is clear that they in some way assess both the willingness and the abil-
ity of a government to repay, when the rating of a sovereign bond is determined.
Standard & Poor’s state that; ”To assess the creditworthiness of an issuer, Stan-
dard & Poor’s evaluates the issuer’s ability and willingness to repay its obligations
in accordance with the terms of those obligations.” (Standard&Poor’s, 2010, p.
11). Furthermore, several different factors are considered; ”In rating a sovereign,
or national government, the analysis may concentrate on political risk, monetary
stability, and overall debt burden” (Standard&Poor’s, 2010, p. 11). Fitch Rat-
ings use a similar approach, and state that ”The sovereign Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs), are a forward-looking assessment of a sovereign’s capacity and willingness
to honor its existing and future obligations in full and on time.” (FitchRatings,
2010, p. 1)
Edwards (1986) provides an empirical analysis on developing countries’ borrow-
ing in international markets. His results support the hypothesis that the factors
determining the assessed risk of bonds are different from those determining risk of
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stocks. One of the explanations suggested by Edwards is that governments often
guarantee for bank loans, thus the risk is lowered. Such lowering of risk is of course
not possible for sovereign bonds.
Lee (1993) explicitly investigates whether credit ratings are based on willing-
ness to repay. Based on a theoretical model, the author lists several variables that,
according to Lee, affect the willingness to repay of the borrowing country. Among
these are the ratio of total foreign debt to exports and the variability of changes
in per capita GDP, that are both supposedly affecting the willingness to repay
negatively. Furthermore, Lee includes the growth rate of per capita GDP, arguing
that higher levels should increase the willingness to repay, and inflation, as an in-
strument for political stability (high levels are expected to decrease the willingness
to repay). Thereafter, the author estimates to what degree these variables affects
the ratings. The results suggest that several of the variables strongly affect the
ratings, and can thus be taken to support the view that the perceived willingness
to pay is important in determining the credit ratings of sovereign bonds.
If a developing country wants to finance investment and government spending
through issuing bonds in international capital markets, it is thus crucial not only
that there is action taken to improve the ability to repay, but also that the gov-
ernment manages to convince the rating agencies - and thus the investors - of its
willingness to do this.
It is clear from the preceding discussion that many factors determine the credit
ratings assigned by the rating agencies to bonds issued by developing country
governments, and that these ratings affect the opportunities for the governments
to borrow money in this manner, and eventually; the price they must pay. In the
next section, I will argue that also the fact that a country receives vast amounts of
development aid, might be one of these factors. The hypothesis is that development
aid might lead to lower ratings through decreasing the willingness to repay that
the rating agencies perceive the countries to have. If this is so, it would add to the
unintended and unforeseen potential effects of development aid discussed earlier
in this thesis.
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3.3 Development Aid and Access to International Capital Markets
The ratings are determined by the probability of default perceived by the rating
agencies. This probability of default is again determined both by the ability the
borrower is believed to have, to repay, and by whether the borrower is perceived
to actually be willing to repay. It is clear that when credit rating agencies assess
a developing country government’s willingness to repay, their analyses suffer from
lack of information. The variables used as measures for this willingness must
to some extent be the same for all countries, and many factors specific to some
country or government are probably unknown to the rating agencies, as they are to
the investors themselves. This of course also holds for the factors determining the
perceived ability of a country to repay, but might be a more severe problem when
assessing the willingness. Some attributes may be considered as giving higher risk
of default, even though that is not necessarily the case for all countries. Factors
such as low growth rates, low income per capita etc., might be interpreted as
”signs” of low creditworthiness, through reducing the willingness to repay of a
given country. However, some countries exhibiting these characteristics might still
in reality have a strong desire to trade in the commercial capital market, and thus
have a strong willingness to repay. If there is no way such a country could signal
that such specific characteristics do not - for that specific country - imply that the
willingness to repay is low, the country might be denied loans in the commercial
market, due to this lack of information available to the potential lender.
My hypothesis is that development aid might have effects that hinder the access
of some developing countries to international capital markets, due to asymmetric
information regarding the actual willingness or wish of different countries to reduce
their dependency on aid. I will in the following attempt to justify this hypothesis.
The mechanism that generally makes credit markets work is the threat of retal-
iation for default, in the form of future difficulties to obtain loans, or higher prices
of loans in the future. In any credit market, there is to some extent asymmetric
information; the lender does not have full knowledge regarding either the ability
or the willingness of the borrower to repay in the future. However, if the lender
knows that the borrower has a strong need for finance in the future, and that
there are no other sources for finance the borrower can turn to if this lender does
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not provide it, the lender at least knows that this provides strong incentives for
repayment. And in most credit markets, a default on a loan will indeed not only
induce the lender of that particular loan to hesitate in giving new loans, but other
possible lenders will after such a default react in the same way.
My hypothesis is that in this framework, aid organizations and other donors of
development aid might work as Samaritans, and thus also face the above discussed
dilemma. The riskiness of giving a loan to a developing country is potentially
perceived as considerably higher if this country is the recipient of foreign aid,
exactly because the punishment mechanism discussed above is not in place to the
same extent. If a country that is denied future loans in the commercial market
can easily turn to aid donors and get finance from this source, this country might
not see the loss from refused access to the commercial market as very severe. This
will of course depend on how the country values the decreased dependency of
aid that follows from getting access to the capital markets, but this valuation is
not necessarily known to the lender! The point is that in general, international
investors cannot distinguish between countries that have a real desire to change
from aid dependents to commercial borrowers, and other countries or governments,
that do only want to take advantage of an opportunity to take up a loan they never
planned to repay. In this framework, there is a difference concerning the types of
the developing countries demanding loans in the international capital market, and
the type of a given country is not (necessarily) known to potential international
investors.
The implications of this hypothesis would potentially be that development aid
could hinder development. If some of the problems connected to aid discussed
in section 2 are perceived as severe by a developing country government, but
this government does not get the opportunity to reduce their aid-dependency by
entering international capital markets because they receive foreign aid, the country
might potentially be ”trapped”.
Yet, one could argue that many of the potentially grave consequences on growth
and development posed by development aid - discussed in section 2 - would not
pose large challenges if the government is of the ”good” type, the type that actually
desires development. If this is what the government wants, one would for example
expect it not to use development aid as an ”excuse” for not performing policy
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reforms etc. that would enhance growth. However, as is obvious, not all the
problems potentially brought about by development aid is of a character such that
a ”good” government could prevent them from surfacing.
For the sake of the argument, let me focus on the story of the Samaritan’s
Dilemma, discussed in section 2.2.1 (Buchanan (1975)). The most simple outline
of this problem is the story where the central government loses its incentives to
provide good policies and institutions to promote growth, because it knows that
aid organizations will step in and provide the necessary assistance when the state
of the economy is bad. Such a government must be said to be short-sighted,
and there might be even worse incentives at play; for example this government
might see it as more easy to redistribute to its ”peers” when the money comes
from development aid than if it had been obtained from commercial loans. In
this situation, the problems connected to development aid are severe, but there
is no reason to believe that such a government would want a lower dependency
of development aid. Thus the asymmetric information problem discussed above is
not really a problem for this country.
But the story might also be a little bit more complicated. The federal govern-
ment might actually want to reduce aid-dependency and induce growth-enhancing
policy reform, and one opportunity to do this would be through issuing bonds in
international markets. However, there might still be large problems connected to
development aid, because other agents in the economy - say regional governments
or even members of the general population - are faced with adverse incentives
due to the future ”aid-possibility”. In this case, there might potentially arise a
situation where the government cannot avoid aid-induced problems, because it is
denied access to alternative forms of finance.
Some countries obviously see aid-dependency as an obstacle to development,
and has taken strong measures to show the rest of the world that they do not want
to be among the countries dependent on development aid. India has a policy not
to take development aid, and South-Africa has after the Apartheid regime showed
that the country does not want to take charity, by paying off loans taken up by
the previous regime. This might be a way to convey information to international
investors that the added risk of being a recipient of development aid, should be
removed, for a particular country. However, this is obviously not an attractive
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path forward for many countries, that are in need of foreign finance.
Finally, a country that strive to create economic growth, and hope to escape
the group of the poorest, might see the entrance on international capital markets as
important. If they grow out of the group of countries that qualify for development
aid, it would be beneficial to already have connections to the financial systems of
the industrialized world. Such considerations should give strong incentives for poor
countries with growth - or hope for growth - to attempt to access the commercial
capital market.
In the next section, I will set up a theoretical model, in an attempt to give a
more thorough evaluation of how development aid might affect the opportunities of
recipient countries to access international capital markets. Even though the model
is simple, it shows that if there are different types of countries and governments,
development aid in some cases might add to already existing credit constraints
faced by developing country governments.
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4 A Simple Model
In this section, I will set up a stylized model to illustrate how loans or grants
from the World Bank, or other donors of development aid, can affect the ability of
developing countries to issue government bonds in commercial international capital
markets.
Several authors have contributed to the literature investigating potential prob-
lems connected to asymmetric information, leading to credit rationing. One in-
fluential paper on this subject is Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). In the following, I
provide a theoretical framework that investigates this subject from a slightly dif-
ferent angle. I do not use a moral hazard framework, but focus solely on the
effects of (predetermined) differences between the countries demanding loans, and
the problems that may arise when the potential lender cannot distinguish the
characteristics of different borrowing countries.
The model presented in this section shows the type of choice the borrowing
country has to make, and how the possible options of this country affect the
willingness of agents in the commercial market to offer loans. The main feature
that may create inefficiency in this model, is that there is hidden information
concerning the utility of the borrowing country from getting a commercial loan -
or the type of the borrowing country. Its type is only known to the developing
country itself, and this information cannot be passed on to any other agent.
4.1 Introduction to The Model
There are three agents in this model; the ”World Bank”, B, a commercial inter-
national lender, L, and a developing country, D.
B offers a loan of size R to D in each period. The only exception occurs if D
defaults on a loan from L. If D takes a loan from L in period t, and defaults on
this loan in period t + 1, there is only a probability p ∈ [0, 1] that B will offer a
loan to D in this period (t+1). In the period after default, one is back to business
as usual. A loan from B to D is always repaid in this setup. These loans are
considered development aid, and have a low interest rate, rB.
L will in each period consider whether he wants to offer a loan, also of size R,
42
to D. If such a commercial loan is offered, the interest rate is rL > r > rB, where
r is the risk free interest rate L can get elsewhere.
If L offers a loan to D, and D takes this loan, but defaults in the following
period, L will never offer a loan to this country again. In the first period (t = 0),
or in any period where D has not defaulted on a loan in the past, L calculates a
probability q ∈ [0, 1], based on the information available, of D defaulting in the
next period if offered a commercial loan. The decision of whether L will offer such
a loan or not, will be based on this probability.
D in each period considers whether he wants to take a loan, and whether (if
possible) he takes it from B or L. If he takes up a loan from B he always repays the
loan, with interest rates, in the next period. In the case where L offers D a loan,
and D chooses to accept this, D will in the following period have the possibility
of defaulting. A default means that he does not pay anything to L. D’s decision
will be based on the present value of current and future utility from the different
options. D discounts future utility by the factor β = 1/(1 + ρ), where ρ > 0 is the
discount rate.
The hidden information that D has, concerning his own type, is the utility uL
that - when the loan is issued by L - is added to his utility from the loan. uL is
unknown to L, but is drawn from a known distribution with CDF F (x) = P (uL <
x), F (0) = 0, limx→∞ F (x) = 1.
4.2 Some Important Assumptions
As mentioned, all three agents are assumed to be risk-neutral. Especially the
assumption that the borrowing country D is risk-neutral, is not very realistic. I
do this to simplify the calculations, and to be able to focus on the main point of
the model. Still, I elaborate briefly on this in section 4.7.4, to get an idea of how
a change in this assumption would affect the model.
I also assume that (1 + ρ) > (1 + rL); D discounts the future sufficiently for
a loan from L to be attractive if no other options are available, and he cannot
choose to default.
rL > r > rB just shows that the interest rate on loans from the World Bank
is low, compared to the commercial interest rate, and the interest rate charged on
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loans to developing countries in the commercial market is higher than the risk-free
outside option available to L. Together with the previous assumption, this also
assures that if the only possibility for D is to take up loans from B and repay in
each following period, he will do so.
In the main part of this thesis, I treat the interest rate paid on loans from L
to D, rL, as exogenous. This might seem unlikely, the usual assumption would be
that this interest rate is changed by L depending on the the perceived riskiness
of borrowing to D. However, one can argue that this is in fact not always what
happens. Many investors have relatively strict rules regarding what levels of risk
they can accept, and when the riskiness of an asset is perceived to be above some
fixed level, the investor will not consider investing in that asset. In section 4.7.1,
I look at how the implications of the model changes, when rL is endogenous.
Futhermore, I assume that all three agents in the model live forever, so the
time span goes from t = 0 to t = ∞. Another way to interpret this assumption,
is that there are only three periods, but the last period lasts for a very ”long”
time. This assumption is useful, because it makes it easier to emphasize that the
punishment from L when D defaults on a loan is quite harsh (never offering a
loan to D ever again). Most importantly, this assumption assures that the model
cannot be solved by backward induction. If this was the case, D would always
have incentives to default in the last period, and this would cause no loans to be
offered from L to D in any case.
In the model, I call the donor of development aid the World Bank. Of course,
any other donor of development aid - a donor country, an aid organization etc. -
would potentially create the same effects.
Furthermore, as is clear from the introduction to the model, this development
aid donor may punish D in the case of a default on a commercial loan. It is of
course possible that p = 1 (the World Bank offers a loan to the developing country
regardless of whether this country has defaulted on a loan from the commercial
lender in the same period), but I include the possibility that the World Bank may
see it as beneficial to show that it will not support defaults in the commercial
market. Additionally, one could imagine that if B does in fact want to punish D
after a default, this punishment might be taken several periods into the future.
In section 4.7.6, I elaborate briefly on how such an extension might change the
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model. I also assume that this donor - the World Bank - does not offer loans
to D in periods when D takes up a commercial loan. This might be justified by
arguing that the World Bank may see a country receiving commercial loans as not
qualifying for development aid.
The assumption that the commercial lender L will never again offer any loans
to a country that has defaulted in the past, is meant to represent the fact that
after a default, it is very difficult for a country to re-enter the commercial capital
market. Though it is of course unlikely that a default results in a permanent
exclusion from the market, this is a convenient way to show the severity of a
default in the commercial market. The assumption can also easily be justified in
the framework of this model, by arguing that if a country has defaulted in the
past, L will perceive the default probability to be 1, and thus does not want to
offer loans to this country ever again.
In the above introduction to the model, I have also assumed that a loan from
B to D is always repaid. One way to justify this assumption, is by arguing that B
might have sufficient means for sanctioning to always force D to repay him, and
in this regard be in a much stronger position than the commercial lender L.
Finally, the utility uL, that D gets from taking up a commercial loan, which
is hidden from the commercial lender, is crucial to the implications of the model.
I will therefore briefly discuss some possible ways to justify the appearance of
this utility in the model. As is clear from the discussion in section 3.3, there are
potentially several reasons why a developing country might find it beneficial to
take up commercial loans to replace development aid. uL represents the value one
specific developing country puts on the opportunity to escape the dependency on
development aid. The reason that a country - or a country’s government - sees it
as beneficial to replace development aid by commercial loans, might be as simple
as some sense of ”pride”; the country does not want to be a recipient of charity.
In relation to how uL appears in this model, it is perhaps more appropriate to
think of this utility as representing some additional gain from trading with L in
the commercial market, not as directly connected to not taking up loans from the
aid donor, B. If the developing country experiences economic growth, and hope to
escape the group of countries qualified for development aid, the government might
see the entrance on the commercial capital market as an important step towards
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becoming a part of the industrialized world. When external finance is important,
the building of connections to the global financial system should be started before
the flows of development aid are gone, and this could explain why some countries
get a higher utility from borrowing from L, than from taking a loan of the same
size from B.
To state this clearly; uL is added to the utility of the developing country, D,
only in the case where the country gains access to the commercial capital market,
by taking up a loan from L. It does not reflect the benefits from the inflowing
money itself, but some external utility connected to accessing the commercial
market.
In the following, I will firstly account for the choices that have to be made by
the potential lender, L, and the borrowing country, D. Next, I investigate how the
different options available to D can affect the resulting allocation of loans, through
the probability the potential lender perceives of a default if he offers a loan to D.
Finally, I discuss several possible extensions of the model.
4.3 The Choice of The Lender, L
Based on all available information, L calculates a probability of default, q, and
based on this, decides whether he wants to offer D a loan or not, in period t = 0.
His problem is to maximize the expected utility in the next period:
max{(1 + rL)R(1− q), (1 + r¯)R}
The condition that must hold for L to offer the loan is thus;
(1 + rL)R(1− q) > (1 + r¯)R
⇒ q < r
L − r¯
1 + rL
(1)
When calculating q, L considers the different options available to D, and based
on what information is available, calculate the probability that a default is the
option giving the highest utility, given that D demands a commercial loan.
It should be mentioned that I make a significant simplification here, in assuming
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that L does not consider potential future gains from trading with D, when making
this decision. This is by no means crucial for the main implication of the model,
however, I investigate how changing this assumption affects the model in section
4.7.7.
4.4 The Choice of The Borrower, D
Which choices the developing country D has to make, depend on whether the
World Bank is present and offers him development aid, or not. The case where
the World bank is not present can be seen as a reference point, and the outcome
when development aid is offered, should be compared with the outcome in this
situation.
4.4.1 The World Bank Not Present
When B is not present, D will always demand a loan from L in period t = 0. He
can choose to repay in the next period or not, but his utility from getting a loan
and not repaying will always be higher than not taking the loan at all. In other
words; if D gets a loan from L, he can choose to default on it, and this strategy
will always be better than not taking up the loan. Thus he is left with only one
choice (that he has to make in period t = 1); whether to repay or not. Since every
period is exactly equal, D will stick to the choices he makes in the first and the
second period for all future periods, in the case where he does not default. Thus,
if he is offered a loan in period t = 0, and chooses to repay in period t = 1, he
will continue to repay in all periods t = 3, 4, ....∞. If he chooses to default on the
loan in period t = 1, he is left with no possibility to borrow money in any future
period.
The present value of current and future utility for each of the two options can
be represented by V˜ P (R, uL, rL, β) and V˜ D(R, uL) with P representing repayment
in all periods, and D representing default in period t = 1. I label these value
functions with a tilde, to distinguish them from the functions in the case where D
is also offered loans from the World Bank. D’s utility from defaulting only depends
on the size of the transfer R, and on uL (the utility from trading with L, which
is specific to this particular developing country). The utility from repayment in
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each period also depends on the interest rate paid on the loans from L, and on the
subjective discount factor β.
Obviously, D will - if he is offered a loan from L - choose to repay in all future
periods if and only if
V˜ P (R, uL, rL, β) > V˜ D(R, uL) (2)
Whether this is the case or not, will depend on all the four variables, R, uL, rL
and β.
4.4.2 World Bank Presence
When D can demand loans both from B and L, there are two different options
available to him in the first period. He can choose to take the loan from B, or
to demand a loan from L. If he chooses the last option, he will have to decide
whether he shall pay his debt to L or not, in the next period. Using the same line
of argument as in the previous section, it is clear that if he chooses not to demand
a loan from L in the first period (and rather take the loans from B), he will do
so also in all future periods. Similarly, if he does demand a loan from L (and is
offered one), and chooses to repay his debt in period t = 1, he will continue to
take loans, and to repay them, in all future periods. If he defaults in period t = 1,
he is left with only one possibility in the future; taking the loans from B. D will
choose the option that gives him the highest present value utility, and this will,
in addition to the other variables, depend on the ”external” utility he gets from
trading with L, uL.
If D chooses to demand a loan from L, the present value of current and future
utility will depend on uL, in addition to the size of the transfer and the discount
factor, both in the case where he defaults in the next period, and in the case where
he chooses to repay the loan in each period. If he defaults, the relevant interest
rate will be rB, because he will in the future borrow from B. If he repays, his
utility depends on rL. In the period immediately succeeding a default, his utility
will also depend on the probability, p, that he does in fact get a loan from B.
Thus, the present value of his utility can be represented by V D(R, uL, rB, p, β)
and V P (R, uL, rL, β) respectively. If he does not demand or get a loan from L,
but takes the loan from B, the value function is V B(R, rB, β) (with B illustrating
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that he chooses to borrow from B in all periods), only dependent on the size of
the transfer, the World Bank-interest rate, and the subjective discount factor.
He will choose to demand a loan from L if and only if either V P or V D is larger
than V B. If this is the case, he will choose to repay his debt to L in all future
periods if and only if
V P (R, uL, rL, β) > V D(R, uL, rB, p, β) (3)
In this case, the probability p also contributes to the determination of whether
this is the case or not.
4.4.3 Comparing The Probabilities of Default
PROPOSITION 1. The probability that a given developing country D will choose
to default on a loan from L, given that L offers him a loan and D takes this loan, is
lower when the World Bank is not present, than it is under World Bank presence.
Proof. This can be seen from calculating the exact probabilities for repayment in
the two cases. In the case where the World Bank is not present offering loans,
x1 is the value of u
L making B indifferent between repaying and defaulting, given
that he both demands and is offered a loan from L. The probability of default,
given that D does actually demand the loan, will then be F (x1). Any country
with uL < x1 will choose to default, while any country with u
L > x1 will repay
and continue to borrow from L. We have already seen that in this situation, D
will always demand such a loan, thus x1 will be given by;
V˜ P (R, x1, r
L, β) = V˜ D(R, x1)⇒ x1(R, rL, β) (4)
To calculate x1, we thus need explicit expressions for these two value functions.
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In Appendix A.1, the value function, and the critical value of uL are shown to be;
V˜ P (R, uL, rL, β) =
R
1− β +
uL
1− β − (1 + r
L)βR
1
1− β (5)
V˜ D(R, uL) = R + uL (6)
⇒ x1 = RrL (7)
Any country with a value of uL < x1 will choose to default on a loan taken
from L. As stated, the probability of default perceived by L if he offers a loan to
D when the World Bank is not present, q1, is thus;
q1 = F (x1) (8)
The corresponding probability under World Bank presence is F (x2), where x2
again represents the value of uL that makes B indifferent between repaying and
defaulting, given that he did actually demand a loan (and that L offered him one).
x2 is given by;
V P (R, x2, r
L, β) = V D(R, x1, r
B, p, β)⇒ x1(R, rL, β) (9)
The calculations are provided in Appendix A.2, giving;
V B(R, rB, β) =
R
1− β − (1 + r
B)βR
1
1− β (10)
V P (R, uL, rL, β) =
R
1− β +
uL
1− β − (1 + r
L)βR
1
1− β (11)
V D(R, uL, rB, p, β)
= R + uL + pβR + β2R
1
1− β − (1 + r
B)pβ2R− (1 + rB)β3R 1
1− β
(12)
⇒ x2 =rLR
+ [pβR− (1 + rB)pβ2R + β2 R
1− β − (1 + r
B)β3
R
1− β ]
1− β
β
(13)
As in the case where the World Bank is not present, x2 is the critical value for
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Figure 1: The present value utility for D in the case where the World Bank is not
present, depending on the choice made by D. x1 represents the critical value of
uL; only countries with a higher value will choose to repay a loan from L.
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uL; any country with uL lower than this value will choose to take a loan from L if
offered one, but will than default in the next period. Thus the default probability
will in this case be;
q2 = F (x2) (14)
In Appendix A.3, it is shown that;
x2 > x1 (15)
Since the Cumulative Distribution Function is of course (weakly) increasing, it
follows that;
q2 = P (u
L < x2) = F (x2) ≥ F (x1) = P (uL < x1) = q1 (16)
Figure 1, 2, and 3 illustrate the proof.
This result is the underlying reason for the proposed inefficiency induced by
the fact that the World Bank is present offering cheaper loans to D, if D does
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Figure 2: The present value utility for D under World Bank presence. x2 represents
the critical value of uL, only countries with a higher value will choose to repay a
loan from L.
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Figure 3: The exact default probabilities perceived by L, are determined by the
known distribution of uL, F (uL).
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not demand - or get - loans from L. If L cannot distinguish between developing
countries of different types (regarding the value of uL), the probabilities q2 and q1
are the probabilities he will use to calculate his expected utility from offering D a
loan in the two cases where B is present and not present.
4.5 Efficiency Considerations
When the potential lender, L, encounters a particular developing country, D, the
probability for default will determine whether a loan is offered or not. It is thus
clear from the above discussion that the presence of the World Bank can affect
this decision made by L.
To be able to consider whether World Bank presence can induce some kind of
inefficiency, I will first attempt to clarify what I consider efficient in this setting.
Both L and D can potentially benefit from trading with each other. In the case
where D does not default, L will gain from an interest rate that is higher than
the risk free rate, and D will benefit from the fact that the country’s dependency
on development aid is reduced (formally depicted by uL). In the case where D
defaults, there are obviously benefits for D, but at the expense of a cost for L.
Consequently, it is only in a situation where there is no default that the trade
creates benefits for both parties. Inefficiency thus prevails in a situation where
a country D demands a loan and plans to repay in the next period, but L does
not supply the loan. This lack of supply from L is in such a situation caused
by the asymmetry of information regarding uL, which leads L to evaluate the
risk of default as positive, even though if he had offered the loan, D would not
have defaulted. Depending on the gap between the ”emerging market” interest
rate,” rL, and the risk free interest rate, r¯, there is a critical level of the default
probability, above which the loan will not be supplied. Denoting this probability
with a *, the critical level (defined by equation (1)) is;
q∗ =
rL − r¯
1 + rL
(17)
An efficient situation is thus the case where no country that does plan to repay
is refused a loan. If L cannot distinguish between countries with different levels of
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uL, this would imply that L offers loans to any developing country. It is clear that
there could still be some defaults, but the expected utility of both parties when a
loan is granted is positive.
To see more clearly how inefficiency may prevail, and how this may depend on
whether the World Bank is present or not, I will start by looking at the situation
where all information is available also to L.
4.5.1 No Hidden Information
In the case where the value of uL for any given country is known to L, there will
be no uncertainty regarding whether one particular country will choose to repay a
loan or not. This will be the case regardless of whether the World Bank is present
or not. In exemplifying it, I will focus on the situation where the World Bank is
indeed present. In this case, L will know that any country with uL < x2 will choose
to default on a loan if he is offered one, and will thus choose not to offer loans
to such a country. All other potential borrowers will have a default probability of
zero, hence any country in this group will be offered a loan by L. To summarize,
when there is no hidden information;
uL < x2 ⇒ No loan offered
uL > x2 ⇒ Loan offered, no default
In this case there is thus no inefficiency, in the sense that all countries which
plan to repay a loan, will be offered one. This situation is also one where a loan
that is granted is always repaid in the next period.
4.5.2 Inefficiency Under Asymmetric Information
As we have seen - as long as the information concerning uL is hidden from L, and
uL is indeed varying across different developing countries - the perceived risk of
default is positive regardless of whether the World Bank is present or not. Thus,
the sort of inefficiency discussed above may prevail in both cases. However, the
perceived default risk is higher under World Bank presence.
PROPOSITION 2. Given the difference between the risk free interest rate
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and the interest rate charged by L on loans to D, there will always exist a dis-
tribution F (uL) with sufficient spread in uL, such that the developing country D
is denied access to the commercial international capital market if and only if the
World Bank is present.
Proof. Since the perceived probability of default is higher when the World Bank
is present than when it is not (Proposition 1), a situation may arise where ;
q1 < q
∗ < q2 (18)
(expressions for the probabilities are given in equations (8), (17) and (14) respec-
tively)
Whether this is the case or not, depends on the distribution F (uL), and on
all exogenous variables in the model. If the inequalities in (18) hold, any country
would be offered a loan if the World Bank was not present (resulting in an efficient
allocation of loans), but no country would be offered a loan under World Bank
presence. In this case, World Bank presence induces inefficiency. When (18) holds,
the situation with and without World Bank presence can be summarized as;
World Bank not present: Any uL ⇒ Loan offered, some defaults
World Bank present: Any uL ⇒ No loan offered
In figure 4, the situation where World Bank presence induces inefficiency is
illustrated.
Inefficiency in allocation of loans is in the first place due to the asymmetry
of information between the lender and the borrower, concerning the benefit the
borrowing country has from trading in the commercial market. However, as is
clear from the above discussion, this inefficiency may in some situations prevail if
and only if the World Bank is present, offering development aid. I will here briefly
elaborate on which factors that determine whether this is the case or not.
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Figure 4: Inefficiency induced by World Bank presence.
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When the exogenous variables of the model are given, so are the critical values
for uL, x1 and x2, below which D will choose to default on a loan from L, in the
cases without and with World Bank presence respectively. However, in determining
the default probabilities, and their relation to the limit value q∗ - below which L
will be willing to supply the loan - the distribution F (uL) (or simply the mean
value and the spread in uL) is crucial. This can be illustrated graphically, by
looking at three different shapes of the cumulative distribution function, when all
exogenous variables are the same. With a distribution such as the one in figure
5, few countries have low values of uL, and this leads to both default probabilities
being below the critical level q∗. When this is the case, there is no inefficiency,
independent of whether the World Bank is present or not. Any country, D, will
be offered a loan in both cases, and there is a positive probability of default. This
probability is higher when the World Bank is present, but still the expected utility
for L is positive.
In figure 6, the distribution is such that there are many countries with low levels
of uL, and both default probabilities are too high for L to offer the loan. In this
case, there is inefficiency due to asymmetric information. Because the expected
utility of L from offering a loan is lower than his outside option, no country will be
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Figure 5: uL is distributed in a way that makes L offer the loan to any country,
also under World Bank presence.
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offered a loan. What is inefficient is of course that the county demanding the loan
might be of a type that would not have defaulted, and the gains from trade for
both parties are lost. However, in this situation, the World Bank does not induce
this inefficiency. Whether a country demanding a loan is offered one or not, does
not depend on whether the World Bank is present.
Finally, in figure 7 we see the situation also illustrated in figure 4. Inefficiency
occurs only if the World Bank is present, because the default probability is then
raised sufficiently for D to not offer loans to any country.
It is clear that the difference between the emerging market interest rate, rL, and
the risk free rate, r¯, that determines the critical value of the default probability,
will affect whether inefficiency prevails or not, and whether World Bank presence
affects the result. If L can charge a very high interest rate on a loan to D, compared
with the risk-free rate, it is more likely that the result will be the situation where
all countries are offered loans independently of whether the World Bank is present
or not (illustrated in figure 5). Correspondingly, a small difference between the
interest rates increases the probability that no country will be offered a loan in
any case (figure 6).
It is also interesting to consider how the difference between the two critical
values of uL is determined by the exogenous variables of the model. The difference
x2 − x1 will - given the distribution of uL - determine the difference between the
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Figure 6: The distribution of uL is such that no country D will be offered a loan,
and this does not depend on whether the World Bank is present.
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Figure 7: With this distribution of uL, inefficiency prevails if and only if the World
Bank is present.
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default probabilities. It should be clear that the larger the difference x2 − x1, the
higher is the probability that World Bank presence will in fact induce inefficiency.
In appendix A.4, I have calculated the derivatives of x2 − x1 with respect to the
size of the loans, R, the three different interest rates, rB, r¯ and rL, and with
respect to the probability of obtaining a loan from B after a default, p. From
these calculations, some notes should be made.
Firstly, if the probability of getting a loan from B in the period after default,
p, is increased, the cost of defaulting when the World Bank is present is lowered.
This leads to an increase in the critical value of uL under World Bank presence,
x2, and thus increases the difference between the two critical values. For any
distribution, this will of course also increase the difference between the two default
probabilities. Also, an increase in the loan size, R, gives a larger difference between
the two critical values, and thus between the default probabilities.
Furthermore, an increase in the World Bank interest rate, decreases the benefits
of borrowing from B, and thus makes it less attractive to default on a loan from
L when the World Bank is present. By decreasing the critical value under World
Bank presence, x2, this leads to a reduction in the difference between the two
critical values. Thus, for a given distribution, an increase in rB decreases the
difference between the default probabilities.
Finally, the effect of a change in r¯ is obviously zero. So is the effect of a change
in rL. An increase in the interest rate paid on loans to L will increase the gains
from defaulting, but this increase is exactly the same independent on whether the
World Bank is present or not.
To end this section, I will emphasize again that the inefficiency is in the first
place induced by asymmetry of information. However, as we have seen, World
Bank presence might be determinant to whether such inefficiency prevails or not.
Finally, we have seen that whether World Bank presence is crucial or not, depends
on all exogenous variables in the model, including the distribution F (uL).
However, there are clearly some assumptions made in this section that are
not particularly realistic. After a brief discussion of the welfare effects of World
Bank presence, I will attempt to discuss the implications of changing some of these
assumptions in section 4.7.
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4.6 Welfare Effects of World Bank Presence
Until now, I have focused solely on how World Bank presence affects the ability
of developing countries to enter commercial international capital markets. The
above analysis suggests that - at least under some circumstances - the presence
of a development aid donor such as the World Bank, may hinder access of some
developing countries that do in fact not plan to default, to these markets. This
is what I have termed ”inefficiency” in the above. As already pointed out, the
underlying cause of this potential inefficiency is the lack of possibilities for potential
lenders to gain knowledge regarding the benefits the borrowing country has from
taking up a commercial loan. This may lead to many countries being denied access
to the markets, as a result of a perceived high risk of default, even though only
some of these countries would actually default. The main implication of my model
is that the presence of this type of inefficiency might be dependent on whether the
World Bank is present or not.
This may suggest that World Bank presence - or the opportunity of developing
countries to get cheaper loans from some development aid donor - is bad. However,
it is important to keep in mind that what I have focused on analytically in this
thesis, is not the total welfare effects of development aid. In section 2, I discussed
several potentially adverse effects of aid. I do however not draw any conclusions
regarding whether development aid is ”good” or ”bad”. What my investigation
is meant to convey is that if a developing country government sees dependency
on development aid as a hinder to growth and development, the possibility of this
country to escape this dependency, might be hindered by the fact that the country
receives foreign aid.
For a country of this type, where the government sees aid-dependency as prob-
lematic, but is not able to use commercial loans as a substitute for financing highly
necessary investments, what I have termed ”World Bank presence”, must be said
to be bad. However, also in my model, there are countries that do not see it as
highly beneficial to take up commercial loans to replace foreign aid. It is clear
that to these countries, access to finance from an aid donor such as the World
Bank can be perceived as ”good”. One can thus not conclude on the basis of this
analysis that aid donors should stop offering ”cheap” loans - or grants - to support
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development in poor countries. The sole implication of the above model is that
one effect of access to development aid, might be the loss of access to commercial
capital markets.
4.7 Extensions of The Model
Among the obviously very simplified assumptions I have made in setting up the
model, is the fact that the commercial market interest rate rL is exogenous, and
that the borrowing country is risk-neutral. In the following, I will elaborate briefly
on these and a few other issues. In parts of this discussion, I will use an analytical
approach, but mostly I will only verbally elaborate on potential effects of changing
the assumptions, or widening the scope. Clearly, a thorough investigation of for
example risk aversion in this model would be an interesting extension, but is
beyond the scope for this thesis.
4.7.1 Endogenous Commercial Interest Rate
In the previous, the implications of the model are based on the fact that the
interest rate charged on the commercial market, rL, is determined outside the
model. When this is the case, a commercial lender will only decide whether to
offer loans or not, depending on the risk of default and the interest rate differential.
As we have seen, presence of the World Bank as an alternative lender, may then
lead to no loans being offered from L. The conclusion is thus that development
aid, in the form of cheap loans from the World bank to developing countries, may
hinder access of these countries to commercial loans.
The assumption that rL is exogenous is, however, not necessarily realistic.
When there is demand for loans, but a high risk of default, the natural reaction
for L would not necessarily be to refuse to offer any loans, but rather to raise the
interest rate. However, the conclusion that the presence of B may hinder access of
developing countries to the commercial markets, does not rest very heavily on this
assumption. When the interest rate is determined by L, and is thus endogenous in
the model, the presence of B will lead to L setting rL higher. In this case, D is not
completely shut out of the market, but the price paid for loans is increased. The
consequence is most probably still that fewer countries will make the transition
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from development aid dependents to commercial borrowers.
If there is competition among lenders in the commercial market, the interest
rate on loans from L to D would be determined by the risk free interest rate, and
the probability of default;
(1 + rL)R(1− qi) = (1 + r¯)R
⇔ rL = r¯ + qi
1− qi (19)
denoting the default probability with i ∈ (1, 2), representing the two cases without
and with World Bank presence.
The commercial interest rate is equal to the risk free outside option if the
probability of default is zero, and it is increasing in this probability of default;
∂rL
∂qi
=
1 + r¯
(1− qi)2 > 0 (20)
Since this probability is higher when B is present - for any rL - the interest
rate charged by L will always be higher when B is present.
qi is a function of r
L itself, leading to a multiplier effect. Whether B is present
or not, the effect on the critical values x1 and x2 of an increase in the commercial
interest rate is the same;
∂x1
∂rL
=
∂x2
∂rL
= R > 0 (21)
An increase in rL will thus increase the probability of default in both cases;
q1 = F (x1)⇒ ∂q1
∂rL
= F ′(x1)
∂x1
∂rL
= F ′(x1)R > 0 (22)
q2 = F (x2)⇒ ∂q2
∂rL
= F ′(x2)
∂x2
∂rL
= F ′(x2)R > 0 (23)
A higher default probability due to presence of the World Bank leads to higher
interest rates, and this effect is strengthened by the effect of the interest rate on
q2. When the World Bank offers development aid to the developing countries, the
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interest rate on commercial loans is increased, which will probably lead to less
trade between D and L.
As a final note here, it should be mentioned that the way this interest rate
is set, of course depends on the functioning of the market that L is a part of. A
further extension would be to include the functioning of this market more explicitly
in the model, to provide a better understanding of how rL is actually set.
4.7.2 Development Aid - Grants or Loans?
Going back to the original set up where the interest rate is exogenous, another
interesting extension would be to look at the implications of this model if B does
not offer loans, but grants to D. A large part of today’s aid transfers are given
as grants. Furthermore, one of the most problematic assumptions in the set up
of the model, is indeed the assumption that D always repays a loan from B. It
is therefore interesting to investigate how the implications of the model changes
when the World Bank, B, offers grants in stead of loans, to D. This means that D
does not repay when he receives money from B. Intuitively, it would be much more
attractive for D to stick to development aid in this case. Even though the interest
rate on the loans from B might be very low, there is a vast difference between a
grant, and a loan that must be repaid in the next period. However, there might of
course be countries that have values of uL high enough to still want to take up and
repay loans from L. The question is whether the previous conclusion that World
Bank presence increases the probability perceived by L for default, is still valid if
the development aid from L is given as grants and not loans.
Whether development aid is given as loans or grants is obviously unimportant
in the scenario where the World Bank is not present. Thus the default probability
in this case is also unchanged. However, the present value utility for D of the
different options, the critical value for uL, and the default probability are slightly
different under World Bank presence. If D chooses to take a loan from L, and
repay in all future periods, his utility will be the same, but the two other options
now give higher utility. The calculations are provided in appendix B.1, here I will
only touch on the implications of changing the model in this way.
When B gives grants, there is no longer a single critical value of uL, above
63
which D will always choose to repay a loan from L. The reason for this is that
now a range of values of uL make the option of not demanding a loan from L at
all, the best option. In the original set up all countries would choose to demand a
loan from L, even a country with a very low value of uL. However, when the aid
from B is given as grants, the cost of potentially loosing this grant in one period,
will for a country with a low value of uL be sufficiently high for this country to
choose not to demand a loan from L at all. If uL is very high, D will still choose
to demand a loan from L, and repay in all future periods if he is offered the loan.
Only when uL is in some ”intermediate” range, will D prefer to default. More
precisely;
(1− p)βR = x2,l < uL < x2,h = rLR + (1− p)βR + pR⇒ Default
where x2,l and x2,h depicts the two critical values of u
L in this case. The value
of the default probability in this case is denoted by a subscript G, (representing
the case with grants in stead of loans), to distinguish it from the original default
probability, and the two default probabilities are represented by;
q1,G = q1 = F (x1) (24)
q2,G = F (x2,h)− F (x2,l) (25)
with x1 = r
LR < x2,h and x2,h > x2,l.
Without knowing the exact distribution of uL among the potential borrowing
countries, these two probabilities cannot be compared. It might be the case that
the default probability is higher under World Bank presence, but the opposite
might be true as well. The reason for this is that while the presence of the World
Bank induces some countries to choose to default in stead of repaying, the presence
also induces some countries that would default if B was not present, to not demand
loans from L at all. What happens to the total size of the group of countries that
would demand a loan, but default in the next period if the loan is offered, thus
depends on the relative strength of these two effects. This again depends on the
distribution F (uL). Thus, when considering how World Bank presence affects D’s
access to the market - in the case where development aid is given as grants instead
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if loans - further investigation is needed to make use of this model in drawing any
conclusions.
4.7.3 World Bank Presence and Ability to Repay
In section 3.2, I briefly discussed how the riskiness of different assets is measured
by investors in international capital markets, and the importance of rating agencies
in this process. From this discussion, it was evident that both the willingness of a
borrower to repay, and his ability to do so, affects the perceived risk of lending to
him. In my model I have completely disregarded the fact that some countries might
not be able to repay either commercial debt or loans regarded as development aid.
This is quite obviously an oversimplification. However, it was made in an attempt
to isolate potential effects of development aid on the perceived risk of lending
to a development country government, through the willingness of this borrowing
country to repay.
It is clear not only that the ability of a borrower to repay will be determinant
to whether he does so or not, but also that development aid - that has been in the
center of my analytical investigation - may affect the borrower’s ability to stand
by his obligations. Though I will not attempt to explain how these relationships
might work, it should be noted that there are probably links between development
aid and a developing country’s ability to repay. Such effects on the ability to repay,
might work in different directions compared with the effects on the willingness that
I have discussed. They should obviously be taken into account in an investigation
attempting to give some sort of overview of effects of development aid on access
of developing countries to international capital markets.
Furthermore, it should be noticed that uncertainty regarding the borrower’s
future ability to repay, might create even more severe problems connected to
asymmetry of information than those discussed here. I have assumed that the
borrowing country always has the means to repay, if he defaults it is because the
gains outweighs the costs of this action. When this is the case, a potential lender
will know that a country that has defaulted, did this because he chose to do so,
not because he was forced by some ”bad” circumstances. An interesting extension
of the analytical framework presented in this thesis, would be to take into account
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potential moral hazard problems that would occur if this assumption had not been
made.
Lastly, in the analytical framework presented in this thesis, the ”external”
utility, uL, that the developing country gets from trading with L, is predetermined
- for a given country, it has the same value in all periods. A clearly relevant
extension of the model would be to include the possibility that uL is drawn (from
a known distribution) in every period, and may thus be different - for the same
country, D - in different periods.
4.7.4 Risk Aversion
In my model, I have assumed that both the lender, L, and the borrower, D, are
risk-neutral. This simplifies the calculations, but is of course also potentially a
simplification that might change the results and implications of the model. It is
beyond the scope of this thesis to do a thorough investigation of the consequences of
relaxing this assumption. However, I will here provide an extension to the original
set up, that might give some indications of what risk-aversion of the borrowing
country would imply. I will keep the assumption that the utility of D is linear, but
add a ”disutility”, −Y in every period where D does not get a loan at all. This
way, I at least include the probable fact that a period with no external financing
might be especially damaging to the developing country.
As can be seen from the calculations in appendix B.2, the main implication of
the original model - that World Bank presence might induce inefficiency through
increasing the default probability perceived by L - is not necessarily affected by
this additional feature.
The critical value of uL, and thus the default probability, in the case where the
World Bank is not present, are decreased. It is much less attractive to default on
a loan from L, when the disutility is added in periods with no loan.
When the World Bank is present, the situation is, however, more complex.
Depending on the size of Y, there are several possible outcomes regarding the
change in the default probability in this case. I have not calculated the critical
values of uL in all cases, but figure 10, 11 and 12, in appendix B.2, illustrate
them graphically. Some calculations to support the figures can also be found in
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appendix B.2. The present value utility of D is the same as in the original set up, if
he chooses either to take development aid from B, or to borrow from L and repay
in all periods. However, if he chooses to default on a loan from L, the expected
present value utility is reduced, because there is a possibility that he will not get
any loan in period t = 1.
If Y is relatively small, the present value of defaulting will still always be higher
than not demanding a loan from L at all. In this case, the default probability is
reduced. But the default probability is reduced less when the World Bank is
present, than when it is not. Thus the probability that World Bank presence
induces inefficiency is greater than with no such ”risk aversion”. The relationship
between the two default probabilities is;
q2,δ − q1,δ = F (x2,δ)− F (x1,δ) ≥ F (x2)− F (x1)
since;
x2,δ − x1,δ = x2 − x1 + Y (1− (1− p)(1− β)) > x2 − x1
When the Y is high, the picture is somewhat more complicated. Firstly, for
some ”intermediate” values of Y , the cost of default is increased sufficiently for
some countries to prefer only demanding loans from B. In this case, there will
be two critical values of uL, and it cannot be determined whether the default
probability is highest under World Bank presence or not. This is what is illustrated
in figure 11 in appendix B.2.
And finally, for quite high values of Y , the default probability is reduced to
zero also when the World Bank is present. In this case, the disutility from one
period with no loan, is sufficiently high for any D to prefer to avoid this situation
with certainty, and thus choose either to demand a loan from L and repay it, or to
only take the loans from B. This case is illustrated in figure 12 in appendix B.2.
Without having discussed risk aversion directly or in detail here, it seems like
a plausible preliminary conclusion could be that if D is sufficiently risk averse to
never want to default on a loan from L (even with only a small punishment from
B), this will remove the possibility that World Bank presence might lead to the
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type of inefficiency discussed in section 4.5. However, for somewhat lower levels
of risk aversion, the main implication of the model might still hold, but this still
depends on the size of Y , and on the shape of the distribution F (uL).
4.7.5 Signalling
In section 4.5, I considered how the presence of the World Bank potentially affects
the allocation of loans in the presence of asymmetric information, and compared
this to the case with no hidden information, i.e. with uL known also to L. With no
asymmetry of information, the result was that any country with sufficiently high
uL, prefers repaying L over defaulting, would obtain a loan from the commercial
lender. This, however, was shown not to be the case when uL is unknown to L.
In this case, World Bank presence potentially induces inefficiency. An obvious
solution to this problem of asymmetric information, would be that the developing
country found some way to signal his type (or more precisely his value of uL),
before the decision of whether to offer a loan or not is made by L in period t = 0.
As mentioned in section 3.3, some countries have to some extent refused ”char-
ity” from the industrialized world, among them are India and South Africa. This
might indeed be a way for these countries to attempt to signal that they strongly
prefer to be independent from development aid, and to participate in the global
markets, including the international capital market.
For many developing countries, however, the cost of this type of signalling
might be regarded too high. Several periods without any external financing might
be necessary, and there would potentially be high uncertainty connected to future
access to the commercial capital market.
In any case, an interesting extension of the model presented in this thesis,
would be to allow for this type of signalling. If D could affect the decision of
L in the future, by for one or more periods not taking the loans from B, the
problems connected to asymmetric information might be reduced. However, such
a possibility could also lead to the arise of several interesting issues concerning the
incentives of countries with different levels of uL to use the opportunity to signal
their type. It might clearly be the case that also some countries that do not plan
to repay a loan from L, might see it as attractive to attempt to signal that they
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would repay.
I will not discuss this issue in further detail here, but it should be emphasized
that if costless signalling was possible, a country with a high value of uL would
give this information to L, and the problem of asymmetric information would
disappear.
4.7.6 The Punishment From B After Default
In the original model, it was assumed that the World Bank do react when a
developing country defaults on a commercial loan, by decreasing the probability of
offering development aid in the following period to p ∈ [0, 1]. This might however
be a quite weak punishment. It is, of course, possible to allow for B to extend
the punishment several periods into the future. Analytically, this can be done by
assuming that the probability of getting the loan from B is p ∈ [0, 1] for n > 1
periods after the default. Or, the probability of getting the loan might be p1 ∈ [0, 1]
in the first period after default, p2 ∈ [0, 1] in the second period after default, and
so on, to allow for the probability to change over time.
I will only sketch the implications that this would have. When the punishment
from B is more severe, the cost of defaulting is higher in the case where the World
Bank is present. This gives a lower critical value of uL in this situation. Thus
the difference between the default probabilities will - for a given distribution of
uL - be decreased. As a result, the probability that World Bank presence induces
inefficiency is reduced.
To relate this to the discussion in section 4.5.2, on how the exogenous variables
affect the default probabilities, extending the punishment into the future would
qualitatively have similar effects as decreasing p. A decrease in p makes a default
under World Bank presence less attractive, and thus reduces the default probability
in this situation. The result is that the difference between the default probabilities -
and thus the probability that World Bank presence induces inefficiency - is reduced.
4.7.7 Forward-Looking Commercial Lender
Until now, I have assumed that the potential lender, L, does not consider potential
future gains from trading with D. L only compares the expected gain from offering
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a loan to D in period t = 0 with his outside option in the same period. However,
since there is a difference between the risk free interest rate and the rate L can
charge from D, L would in reality probably also consider the future gains from
lending to D. If D does not default in period t = 1, L will know that he will
continue to repay in all future periods. The interest rate differential will then lead
to larger revenues for L in all future periods.
The only consequence of bringing the fact that the lender is forward-looking into
the model is that the critical value of the default probability, above which L will
refuse to offer the loan in period t = 0, is somewhat higher. When also considering
the potential future gains, L will be willing to take a risk that is slightly larger.
The difference between the two critical values of the default probabilities of course
depends on the subjective discount factor of L.
The critical value in the situation where the potential lender is forward-looking
is calculated in appendix B.3. Denoting the critical value with a hat, and using
the discount factor δ (to allow for the possibility that L and D do not discount
the future in exactly the same way), it is shown to be:
qˆ =
rL − r¯
(1 + rL)− δ(1 + r¯) > q
∗
This does not change the main implication of the model. The default proba-
bilities are still different in the two cases where the World Bank is present or not
present, and depending on the distribution F (uL), a situation where World Bank
presence induces inefficiency may still arise.
There are obviously also a whole range of possible extensions of the model that
I have not discussed here. Due to the limited time at disposal, I have to leave this
for future investigation.
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5 Conclusion
The aim of this thesis was to investigate a potential link between development aid
and the recipient country’s possibility to enter commercial international capital
markets. In a theoretical framework, I have analyzed the hypothesis that devel-
opment aid might be a hindrance for access to these markets for some developing
countries. The main implication of the analytical model presented in this thesis
is that the presence of a donor of development aid - such as the World Bank -
under some circumstances will increase the probability of default perceived by a
commercial lender sufficiently for this lender not to offer any loans to the receiver
of the foreign aid. Inefficiency - understood as mutually beneficial private lending
arrangements not being carried out - may prevail as a result of the presence of
this donor. This happens because developing countries eager to borrow money -
and to stand by their obligations in the future and repay their loans - are denied
access to such loans, due to the fact that the riskiness is perceived to be too high
for the commercial lender.
Although I do not draw any conclusions regarding the overall effects of inflows
of development aid to a developing country, it is clear that there are potentially
adverse effects at place. The opportunity to use commercial capital markets as
an alternative way of financing investment that can spur development, and reduce
their dependency of development aid, might be seen as beneficial by a developing
country government. A developing country with a growing economy should also
be prepared for a reduction - or even a removal - of the amounts of development
aid received. The possibility to enter international capital markets is crucial for
such a country. It is thus clear that if development aid hinders access to interna-
tional capital markets, a country is potentially trapped in a situation with high
dependency on foreign aid.
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A Present Value Utilities and Calculation of Default Proba-
bilities
A.1 World Bank Not Present
In period t = 0, the present value of current and future utility for Dfrom lending
from L and repaying in all future periods consists of the discounted value of all
current and future transfers, and the present value of all (current and) future
repayments (with interest rates);
V˜ P (R, uL, rL, β) = R
∞∑
t=0
βt + uL
∞∑
t=0
βt − (1 + rL)R
∞∑
t=1
βt
=
R
1− β +
uL
1− β − (1 + r
L)βR
1
1− β
In the second line, I use the fact that since β is strictly smaller than 1, the
geometric succession can be simplified;
∑∞
t=0 β
t = 1/(1 − β), and equivalently∑∞
t=1 β
t = β/(1− β) and so on.
Correspondingly, the present value utility if he chooses not to repay the loan
in period t = 1, will be;
V˜ D(R, uL) = R + uL
The value of uL that makes B indifferent between the two, x1, can then be
calculated as;
V˜ P (R, uL, rL, β) = V˜ D(R, uL)
⇔ R
1− β +
uL
1− β − (1 + r
L)β
R
1− β = R + u
L
⇔β R
1− β + βu
L 1
1− β − (1 + r
L)β
R
1− β = 0
⇔uL = (1 + rL)R−R = rLR
⇒x1 = rLR
Finally, the default probability perceived by L when the World Bank is not
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present, q1, will then be;
q1 = P (u
L < x1) = P (u
L < RrL) = F (RrL)
A.2 World Bank Present
The present value of current and future utility for D in the three cases where he
borrows from B, borrows from L and repays and where he borrows from L and
defaults, can respectively be calculated as;
V B(R, rB, β) = R
∞∑
t=0
βt − (1 + rB)R
∞∑
t=1
βt
=
R
1− β − (1 + r
B)βR
1
1− β
V P (R, uL, rL, β) = R
∞∑
t=0
βt + uL
∞∑
t=0
βt − (1 + rL)R
∞∑
t=1
βt
=
R
1− β +
uL
1− β − (1 + r
L)βR
1
1− β
V D(R, uL, rB, p, β) =R + uL + pβR +R
∞∑
t=2
βt − pβ2(1 + rB)R− (1 + rB)R
∞∑
t=3
βt
=R + uL + pβR + β2R
1
1− β − (1 + r
B)pβ2R
− (1 + rB)β3R 1
1− β
An this case, it is not necessarily enough to find the value of uL that makes
D indifferent between repaying or defaulting on a loan from L, to find the default
probability. This probability must be calculated given that D actually demands
the loan (thus given that he does not choose only to demand a loan from B).
However, it can be shown that with these expression for present value utility, D
will - for no values of uL, choose to not demand a loan from B, even if he has this
opportunity. The intuitive explanation for this is that the the gain from taking
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up a loan from L and defaulting on this loan in the next period, is always higher
than the expected punishment from B (a probability p ≤ 1 of getting a loan in
the period immediately following the default).
The easiest way to see this mathematically, is by looking at what values the
value functions take when uL = 0, and then how the functions change as uL
increases;
∂V B
∂uL
= 0
∂V P
∂uL
=
1
1− β < 1
∂V D
∂uL
= 1
⇒ ∂V
P
∂uL
>
∂V D
∂uL
>
∂V B
∂uL
When uL = 0, the three functions take the values:
V B(R, rB, β) =
R
1− β − (1 + r
B)βR
1
1− β
V P (R, 0, rL, β) =
R
1− β − (1 + r
L)βR
1
1− β
V D(R, 0, rB, p, β) = R + pβR + β2R
1
1− β − (1 + r
B)pβ2R− (1 + rB)β3R 1
1− β
These expressions yield
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V B(R,rB, β)− V P (R, 0, rL, β)
=R/(1− β)− (1 + rB)βR/(1− β)−R/(1− β) + (1 + rL)βR/(1− β)
=(rL − rB)βR 1
1− β > 0
V D(R,0, rB, p, β)− V B(R, rB, β)
=R + pβR + β2
R
1− β − (1 + r
B)pβ2R− (1 + rB)β3 R
1− β
− R
1− β + (1 + r
B)β
R
1− β
=R + pβR + β2
R
1− β
=− R
1−β︷ ︸︸ ︷
−R− βR− β2 R
1− β
− (1 + rB)pβ2R− (1 + rB)β3 R
1− β
+
=(1+rB)β R
1−β︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1 + rB)βR + (1 + rB)β2R + (1 + rB)β3
R
1− β
=− βR(1− p) + (1 + rB)βR[1 + β(1− p)]
=βR[(1 + rB)(1 + β(1− p))− (1− p)] > 0
⇒ V D(R, 0, rB, p, β) > V B(R, rB, β) > V P (R, 0, rL, β)
This is was is illustrated in figure 2. V D, or both V D and V P , will aways be
higher than V B.
It should then be clear that to find the default probability perceived by L in
the case were the World Bank is present, it is sufficient to find the level of uL that
is such that V P (R, uL, rL, β) = V D(R, uL, rB, p, β);
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V P (R, uL, rL, β) = V D(R, uL, rB, p, β)
⇔ R
1− β +
uL
1− β − (1 + r
L)β
R
1− β
= R + uL + pβR− (1 + rB)pβ2R + β2 R
1− β − (1 + r
B)β3
R
1− β
⇔β R
1− β + β
uL
1− β − (1 + r
L)β
R
1− β
= pβR− (1 + rB)pβ2R + β2 R
1− β − (1 + r
B)β3
R
1− β
⇔uL = −R + (1 + rL)R
+ [pβR− (1 + rB)pβ2R + β2 R
1− β − (1 + r
B)β3
R
1− β ]
1− β
β
= rLR
+ [pβR− (1 + rB)pβ2R + β2 R
1− β − (1 + r
B)β3
R
1− β ]
1− β
β
⇒ x2 = rLR
+ [pβR− (1 + rB)pβ2R + β2 R
1− β − (1 + r
B)β3
R
1− β ]
1− β
β
Finally, the default probability perceived by L when the World Bank is present,
q1, will then be;
q2 =P (u
L < x2)
=P (uL < rLR
+ [pβR− (1 + rB)pβ2R + β2 R
1− β − (1 + r
B)β3
R
1− β ]
1− β
β
)
=F (rLR
+ [pβR− (1 + rB)pβ2R + β2 R
1− β − (1 + r
B)β3
R
1− β ]
1− β
β
)
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A.3 Comparing Default Probabilities
Some further calculations are then necessary to show that the default probability
perceived by L is lower when the World Bank is not present, than it is under World
Bank presence. Firstly, I show that x2 > x1
x2−x1
=rLR
+ [pβR− (1 + rB)pβ2R + β2 R
1− β − (1 + r
B)β3
R
1− β ]
1− β
β
− rLR
=[pβR− (1 + rB)pβ2R + β2 R
1− β − (1 + r
B)β3
R
1− β ]
1− β
β
> 0 (26)
because
pβR− (1 + rB)pβ2R
= pβR(1− (1 + rB)β) > 0
and
β2
R
1− β − (1 + r
B)β3
R
1− β
= β2
R
1− β (1− (1 + r
B)β) > 0
since
1
β
= 1 + ρ > 1 + rB ⇔ (1 + rB)β < 1
Since the Cumulative Distribution Function is of course (weakly) increasing, it
follows that;
q2 = P (u
L < x2) = F (x2) ≥ F (x1) = P (uL < x1) = q1
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Where q2 and q1 are the probabilities for default perceived by L when the World
Bank is present and when the World Bank is not present, respectively.
A.4 Determinants of The Default Probabilities
For a given distribution F (uL), the default probabilities are determined by x1 and
x2. The probability that World Bank Presence will give inefficiency if it is not
the case when no development aid is available, is larger the larger the difference
between these two critical values. I here calculate how this difference is affected
by the exogenous variables in the model.
In A.3, it was shown that;
x2−x1 = [pβR− (1 + rB)pβ2R + β2 R
1− β − (1 + r
B)β3
R
1− β ]
1− β
β
The partial derivatives can then be calculated as;
∂(x2 − x1)
∂p
= R(1− β)(1− (1 + rB)β) > 0
∂(x2 − x1)
∂R
= (β + p(1− β))(1− (1 + rB)β) > 0
∂(x2 − x1)
∂rB
= −βR(p(1− β) + β) < 0
∂(x2 − x1)
∂r¯
= 0
∂(x2 − x1)
∂rL
= 0
For a given distribution of uL, the difference between the default probabilities
when the World Bank is not present and under World Bank presence is thus
increasing in p and R, and decreasing in rB.
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B Calculations For Extensions
B.1 Default Probabilities With Grants From B
The default probability when the World Bank is not present, is obviously not
affected by whether development aid is given as grants of loans. However, it does
change when the World Bank is present. The present value of current and future
utility for D in this situation is for the three options respectively;
V BG (R, β) =
R
1− β
V PG (R, u
L, rL, β) =
R
1− β +
uL
1− β − (1 + r
L)βR
1
1− β
V DG (R, u
L, p, β) = R + uL + pβR + β2R
1
1− β
where the subscript G representing grants.
V PG (R, u
L, rL, β) is unchanged compared to the situation with loans, but if D
chooses either of the other two options, he now gets a higher utility than if B gave
loans. It can easily be seen that
V BG (R, β) > V
D
G (R, 0, p, β) > V
P
G (R, 0, r
L, β)
and furthermore, that
∂V PG
∂uL
>
∂V DG
∂uL
>
∂V BG
∂uL
To find the default probability in this case, I first find the values of uL that
would lead D to demand a loan from L, but default in the next period. This is
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Figure 8: The value functions for D in the case where the World Bank is present,
and offers grants to D.
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equivalent to finding when the three function cross each other;
V BG (R, β) = V
D
G (R, u
L, p, β)⇒ uL = (1− p)βR = x2,l ≥ 0
V PG (R, u
L, rL, β) = V DG (R, u
L, p, β)⇒ uL = rLR + (1− p)βR + pR = x2,h > 0
l and h representing the low and high critical value of uL. It is easily seen that
x2,h > x2,l.
As long as the probability, p, of B offering the grant in a period with default is
not zero, there are some (low) values of uL that leads toD choosing not to demand a
loan from L at all, namely those uL < x2,l. Any country with u
L > x2,h will demand
loans from L, and repay in all future periods. A country with x2,l < u
L < x2,h
would demand the loan, but default in the next period. The two critical values
are illustrated in figure 8. The default probability perceived by L in this situation
is thus;
q2,G = F (x2,h)− F (x2,l)
Remembering that the default probability when the World Bank is not present
was q1 = F (x1), with x1 = r
LR < x2,h, it is clear that the default probabilities with
and without World Bank presence are not directly comparable in this situation.
Which one is highest cannot be determined without knowing the shape of the
87
distribution F (uL).
B.2 Default Probabilities With Disutility From Absence of Loan
If D has gets a disutility with absolute value Y in each period when he does not
receive a loan neither from L nor from B, the present value of current and future
utility will be different when he defaults. Here, I will set up the value functions
of D when this is the case, and from this calculate the default probabilities with
and without World Bank presence, when this disutility from absence of loan is
present. To distinguish the value functions, the critical values of uL and the
default probabilities, from those in the original model, I here note these with a
subscript δ (representing the case with disutility).
B.2.1 Disutility When World Bank Not Present
In this case, the value functions take the form;
V˜ Pδ (R, u
L, rL, β) =
R
1− β +
uL
1− β − (1 + r
L)βR
1
1− β = V˜
P (R, uL, rL, β)
V˜ Dδ (R, u
L, Y ) = R + uL − Y β
1− β = V˜
D(R, uL)− Y β
1− β
And using the same approach as in appendix A, the critical value for uL, and
the default probability perceived by L, is calculated, giving;
x1,δ = r
LR− Y = x1 − Y
q1,δ = P (u
L < x1,δ) = F (x1,δ) < F (x1)
where x1 is of course the critical value for u
L in the original set up, where
the disutility Y is not present. The value functions in this case are illustrated in
figure 9. The critical value of uL, and thus the default probability, are reduced. If
Y > x1 ⇔ Y > rLR, the default probability without World Bank presence is zero.
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Figure 9: The present value utility in the situation where the World Bank is not
present, adding a disutility in every period with no loan.
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B.2.2 Disutility Under World Bank Presence
The value functions when the World Bank is present, are;
V Bδ (R, r
B, β) =
R
1− β − (1 + r
B)βR
1
1− β = V
B(R, rB, β)
V Pδ (R, u
L, rL, β) =
R
1− β +
uL
1− β − (1 + r
L)βR
1
1− β = V
P (R, uL, rL, β)
V Dδ (R, u
L, rB, p, β, Y ) =R + uL + pβR + β2R
1
1− β − (1 + r
B)pβ2R
− (1 + rB)β3R 1
1− β − (1− p)βY
=V D(R, uL, rB, p, β)− (1− p)βY
If Y is relatively small, the present value of defaulting will still always be higher
than not demanding a loan from L at all. In this case, the default probability is
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Figure 10: The value functions with disutility from no loan, under World Bank
presence, for a relatively low value of Y
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Figure 11: The value functions with disutility from no loan, under World Bank
presence, for intermediate values of Y .
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Figure 12: The value functions with disutility from no loan, under World Bank
presence, for high values of Y
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reduced, and the situation is illustrated in figure 10. This is the case if;
V Dδ (R, 0, r
B, p, β, Y ) > V Bδ (R, r
B, β)
⇔ Y < R[(1 + rB)β − 1] > 0
The critical value of uL, and the default probability is then calculated as;
⇒ x2,δ = rLR
+ [pβR− (1 + rB)pβ2R + β2 R
1− β − (1 + r
B)β3
R
1− β ]
1− β
β
− Y (1− p)(1− β)
⇒ q2,δ = P (uL < x2,δ) = F (x2,δ) < F (x2)
In this case, the default probability is reduced more when the World Bank is
not present, than when it is present, and thus the probability that World Bank
presence induces inefficiency is greater than with no such ”risk aversion”. The
relationship between the two default probabilities is;
q2,δ − q1,δ = F (x2,δ)− F (x1,δ) ≥ F (x2)− F (x1)
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since;
x2,δ − x1,δ = x2 − x1 + Y (1− (1− p)(1− β)) > x2 − x1
However, when the Y is high, the picture is somewhat more complicated.
Firstly, for some ”intermediate” values of Y , the cost of default is increased suf-
ficiently for some countries to prefer only demanding loans from B. In this case,
there will be two critical values of uL, and it cannot be determined whether the
default probability is highest under World Bank presence or not. This is what is
illustrated in figure 11.
And finally, for quite high values of Y , the default probability is reduced to
zero also when the World Bank is present. In this case, the disutility from one
period with no loan, is sufficiently high for any D to prefer to avoid this situation
with certainty, and thus choose either to demand a loan from L and repay it, or
to only take the loans from B. This case is illustrated in figure 12.
B.3 Forward-Looking Lender
If the potential lender is forward-looking, the expected revenues (and thus utilities)
that he compares will be;
pi1 = (1 + r¯)R
δ
1− δ −R
1
1− δ
if he does not offer a loan to D in period t = 0. And;
pi2 = q(1 + r¯)R
δ2
1− δ + (1− q)(1 + r
L)R
δ
1− δ −R
1
1− δ
if he does offer D the loan in period t = 0. Where q is the perceived default
probability, and δ is the subjective discount factor of the lender.
The default probability that makes L indifferent between the two options, can
the be calculated as;
qˆ =
rL − r¯
(1 + rL)− δ(1 + r¯) > q
∗
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This critical value of the default probability will be higher than in the case
where the lender is not forward-looking, where the value is q∗. This is easily seen
from the expression; δ = 0⇒ qˆ = q∗, while δ > 0⇒ qˆ > q∗.
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